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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM DEBATE 
One of the most often quoted tenets from Sun Tzu’s The Art of War is “know 
your enemy and know thyself, in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.”1  The 
primary goal of intelligence is to understand the intentions and capabilities of adversaries 
in order to provide critical information to decisionmakers.  The Intelligence Community 
has come under intense scrutiny over the last few years as policymakers try to find out 
what we knew and when we knew it to see if the terrorist attacks on 9/11 could have been 
prevented.  Critics of the Intelligence Community state that the intelligence apparatus has 
done a sub-standard job of knowing the enemy.  The various intelligence “failures” 
identified by the critics in the last few years are: the inability to detect the Indian nuclear 
test in 1998, a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that incorrectly stated North Korea 
was at least ten years away from fielding an intercontinental ballistic missile,2 most 
recently the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the October 2002 NIE that incorrectly declared 
Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and was actively rebuilding its 
nuclear program.   
The Intelligence Community needs to undergo a significant transformation to 
meet the challenges of 21st century adversaries who are gaining more skilled in their use 
of asymmetrical warfare.  North Korea is one of these adversaries.  Famously labeled by 
President Bush as one of the members of the “Axis of Evil,” the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK) poses a real threat to the United States and its allies.  The 
North Korean nuclear program is one of the most dangerous issues now facing the Pacific 
region and the international community.  The continued development of the North 
Korean nuclear weapons program, as well as its biological and chemical weapons 
programs, also has significant and precarious implications on United States strategy and 
policy.  The recent diplomatic effort of the United States regarding North Korea, and 
 
1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 84. 
2 Frank Carlucci, ed., Taking Charge: A Bipartisan Report to the President Elect on Foreign Policy 
and National Security (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2000), 261. 
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North Korean government statements about the validity of its nuclear program has 
brought the nuclear issue back to the front pages of newspapers.  Currently, the United 
States has elements of a strategy in place to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue, 
although until recently, this issue has not been a priority with the Bush administration.   
B. THE NORTH KOREAN WMD THREAT: IT IS REAL 
The North Korean nuclear program is of grave concern because North Korea’s 
nuclear aspirations could encourage other nations, such as neighboring Japan and South 
Korea, to develop their own nuclear weapons.  This raises the possibility of a significant 
change in the balance of power in any region of the world.  The current nuclear crisis 
began in December 2002, when North Korea announced its intent to renege on the 1994 
United States-North Korea Agreed Framework and restart its nuclear reprocessing 
facilities at Yongbyon.  In January 2003, North Korea sent notification to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Security Council 
that Pyongyang was withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  North Korea finally 
admitted to possessing nuclear weapons in April 2003 and offered veiled threats of 
possible exporting of nuclear materials.  The exact number of  weapons it may have is 
hard to know, but the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has estimated that North Korea 
has one or two nuclear bombs that were assembled with plutonium reprocessed between 
1989 and 1991,3 and it is unknown if these have been weaponized.  In October 2004, 
North Korea stated that in June it had completed the reprocessing of the 8,000 spent fuel 
rods previously monitored under IAEA safeguards.4 
Additionally, there is a possibility of North Korea selling nuclear weapons or 
nuclear-related technology to terrorist elements intent on causing harm to Americans or 
American interests.  This is a scenario that must not be taken lightly.  Recent allegations 
of North Korea having sold processed uranium to Libya only heighten the fear of such a 
 
3 “North Korea Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Program Overview: History and Status,” Nuclear 
Threat Initiative Online, http://www.nti.org/db/profiles/dprk/NKN_OGO .html (accessed June 2005). 
4 DCI Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center, “Unclassified Report to 
Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced 
Conventional Munitions: 1 July - 31 December 2003,” 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/july_dec2003.htm (accessed July 2005). 
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scenario coming to fruition.  Reports state that international inspectors tested 
approximately two tons of uranium material that Libya surrendered to the United States 
in 2004 when it abandoned its nuclear program, and that there was a ninety percent 
certainty that the processed uranium sold to Libya did in fact come from North Korea.5   
Of equal concern are North Korea’s biological and chemical weapons programs, 
which pose an immediate threat to American interests in the Pacific region because of the 
close proximity to friendly military forces on the peninsula.  A North Korean biological 
or chemical attack on a friendly military or civilian installation would have devastating 
effects on coalition military operations and readiness, and would cause extreme panic that 
could effectively halt recovery operations.  The problem is that the United States does not 
have much information on their dangerous unconventional weapons programs, and there 
are too many intelligence gaps that exist on North Korea as a whole which prevent 
United States policymakers from gaining a comprehensive picture of the intentions of this 
rogue nation.  North Korea has been described as possessing a “dedicated, national-level 
effort to achieve a biological weapon capability and has developed and produced, and 
may have weaponized, biological weapon agents in violation of the [Biological and 
Toxin Weapons] Convention.”6  It is assessed to have anthrax, botulism, plague, cholera, 
yellow fever, hemorrhagic fever, smallpox, and typhoid.  The North Korean chemical 
weapons program is just as problematic.  It is assessed to have 2,500 to 5,000 tons of 
chemical agents, primarily mustard, sarin, phosgene and V-series nerve agents.7  
North Korea’s possession of weapons of mass destruction poses a threat to 
America’s interests in the region.  But why there is so little information about North 
Korea’s unconventional weapons program?  The Intelligence Community must prevent a 
repeat of the problems in uncovering Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.  Chapter II 
examines why North Korea is such a difficult intelligence problem and why the 
 
5 “Report: N. Korea May Have Sold Uranium,” ABC News Online Service, 2 February 2005, 
http://abcnews.go.com/ International/wireStory?id=464528, (accessed February 2005). 
6 “North Korea Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Program Overview: History and Status,” Nuclear 
Threat Initiative Online, http://www.nti.org/db/profiles/dprk/NKN_OGO .html (accessed June 2005). 
7 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Unconventional 
Weapons,” in Planning the Unthinkable, ed. Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 2000), 191. 
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isolationist country continues to pursue weapons of mass destruction.  This part of the 
thesis will also discuss more of what we know and what we do not know about their 
unconventional weapons program, and whether or not the United States possesses the 
intelligence apparatus to truly decipher the North Korean threat. 
The North Korean issue is inherently difficult to understand.  The insular nature 
of North Korea prevents the United States and other allies from truly understanding the 
real intentions of this isolationist country.  It is incumbent upon the United States to deal 
with the North Korean situation now before the crisis moves past a point of no return.  
Six-party talks between the United States, China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and 
Russia aimed at diffusing the nuclear crisis had been on hold since June 2004.  North 
Korea announced on 10 February 2005 that it officially has developed nuclear weapons 
and that it was debating a return to the six-party talks, but only if certain criteria were 
met.  North Korea has only recently agreed to return to the fourth round of nuclear talks, 
after the United States clarified its positions to the North Koreans to recognize North 
Korea as a sovereign state, not to invade the country, and to hold bilateral discussions 
within the framework of the six-party talks.8   
Negotiations resumed at the end of July 2005, but there was no cause for 
optimism as the talks concluded with no agreement.  During those negotiations, the 
United States presented to North Korea evidence that the North Koreans clandestinely 
procured uranium enrichment technology from the A.Q. Khan network.  American 
officials shared the intelligence with North Korea in order to convince Pyongyang that 
disarmament discussions must include the nuclear weapons program it has touted, but 
also a second program that it now says does not exist.9  A new round began in September 
2005, with North Korea making more demands which threatened to push the talks into 
further disarray.  In what has been cautiously touted as a breakthrough in the crisis, North 
Korea ultimately agreed to dismantle its nuclear weapons program in return for economic 
 
8 “N. Korea Agrees to Rejoin Nuke Talks,” CNN Online News Service, 10 July 2005, 
http://www.cnn.com/ 2005/WORLD/asiapcf/07/09/koreas.nuclear.ap/index.html, (accessed July 2005). 
9 David E. Sanger and Jim Yardley, “U.S. Offers N. Korea Evidence That Nuclear Secrets Came From 
Pakistani's Network,” New York Times Online News Service, 28 July 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/29/ politics/29korea.html (accessed July 2005). 
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assistance and security guarantees. However, the Bush administration is dealing with   
this breakthrough with skepticism, as the DPRK lashed out with aggressive statements 
accusing the United States of planning a nuclear attack just four days after agreeing to 
end the nuclear crisis.  The tenuous situation on the peninsula highlights the fact that the 
longer it takes to unearth intelligence on North Korea’s unconventional weapons 
capability, the more unprepared our forces will be when and if the situation escalates to a 
military confrontation. 
C. INTELLIGENCE REFORM INITIATIVES 
So how does the United States gain an understanding of this complex North 
Korean threat?  To truly understand the implications of this situation, to make quality 
intelligence assessments, and to assist in counterproliferation efforts to protect friendly 
assets and personnel, an enemy’s intentions and capabilities need to be clearly 
understood.  This requires timely, tailored, and accurate intelligence information.  It is the 
job of the Intelligence Community to decipher the capabilities and intentions of North 
Korea, and be able to articulate those intentions to the country’s decisionmakers, both 
military and civilian.  However, the Intelligence Community has had their share of 
problems staying one step ahead of our adversaries.  The failures of the Intelligence 
Community have become front page news worldwide, and those failures have been 
politicized to the point of intelligence reform being a prominent issue in the 2004 
presidential election.  How the Intelligence Community should or should not operate has 
become commonplace in public debate like no other time in the nation’s history.  The 
Intelligence Community as an entity has suffered from numerous problems: too many 
layers of bureaucracy and redundancy, an unending amount of “stovepipes” that exist 
throughout the various intelligence agencies, and not enough crosstalk or coordination 
between the agencies.  There have been a number of initiatives that have been proposed 
to enact reform in the Intelligence Community, outlined in the 2002 National Security 
Strategy of the United States, the Department of Defense Transformation Goals, the 9/11 
Commission Report, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and 
the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons 
of Mass Destruction.  The goal of all of these proposals and reform initiatives is to make 
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the Intelligence Community and its fifteen intelligence agencies a more efficient and 
successful entity at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.  Chapter III of the thesis 
will discuss in detail a few of the more critical intelligence reform initiatives currently 
ongoing in the Intelligence Community.   
As it was brought to light in many of these documents, the Intelligence 
Community is not adequately organized to provide the type of comprehensive and 
detailed intelligence information that is necessary for the United States to combat threats 
such as North Korea’s unconventional weapons programs, their nuclear ambitions, and 
their proliferation efforts.  The United States Intelligence Community in its current 
configuration must be revamped in order to be prepared for the dynamic threats of the 
21st century.  Until intelligence reform becomes a real priority within the government, 
there will always be problems with unity of effort in filling in the intelligence gaps that 
exist on difficult threats throughout the world.  Interestingly, there are a number of senior 
level intelligence and Department of Defense officials who do not think that too much 
change is necessary for the Intelligence Community.  Those who hold this viewpoint 
believe that change for the sake of change will not give us any better intelligence data, 
and that a complete overhaul of the Intelligence Community in a time of war could have 
detrimental effects on military operations. 
Numerous transformation and reform efforts at various intelligence agencies such 
as the CIA and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) are ongoing and will 
be discussed in Chapter III.  The CIA has endured extensive criticism for their failure to 
uncover intelligence on Iraq’s WMD program, and as a result, it has recently gone 
through a number of significant changes in their human intelligence (HUMINT) 
operations to ensure that another failure does not occur.  The NGA has also been 
transforming their imagery intelligence (IMINT) operations to streamline efforts to 
ensure warfighters and policymakers get their products quickly and in a user-friendly 
format.   
A significant portion of the chapter will focus on the extensive transformation 
efforts that have occurred at the National Security Agency (NSA) which were designed to 
move the secretive signals intelligence (SIGINT) and information assurance agency from 
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a Cold War posture to a dynamic 21st century information warfare mentality.  In 2000, 
Congress reported that NSA was in danger of starting the new century without the 
technological infrastructure and human resources needed even to maintain the status quo, 
much less meet emerging challenges.10  Faced with the threat of becoming irrelevant in 
the information age, NSA went through a dramatic reform effort to streamline its 
intelligence operations to go up against a much different enemy than they had faced for 
almost 50 years.  The transformation ongoing at NSA is an excellent example of how 
intelligence reform efforts can produce positive results that ultimately will help us to 
better understand and eventually defeat our adversaries.  
D. A REVAMPED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO UNDERSTAND 
NORTH KOREA’S WMD PROGRAM 
The restructuring of the Intelligence Community should help the United States 
gain increased capabilities to better understand challenging threats such as North Korea.  
But exactly how will the changes ongoing in the Intelligence Community help to provide 
quality intelligence on North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction program?  Chapter IV 
will explore this question, looking at the reforms within the categories of intelligence 
collection, intelligence analysis, and intelligence collaboration.  Many of the intelligence 
agencies are currently undergoing transformational efforts to better understand the 
intentions and capabilities of adversaries such as North Korea and terrorist elements such 
as Al-Qaeda.  Recently appointed Director of National Intelligence (DNI) John 
Negroponte has a difficult road ahead.  This will be the largest restructuring of the 
Intelligence Community in its history.  There are many things that need to be done in 
order to help enhance the capabilities of the Intelligence Community apparatus.  It will be 
Negroponte’s job to bring together a relatively disjointed assortment of intelligence 
agencies and elements, in addition to fighting a turf war with Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld and the Department of Defense (DoD), who controls approximately 
eighty percent of the overall intelligence budget.  The DNI stated that he will have to 
 
10 U.S. Congress, “Senate Report 106-279 - Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2001 for the 
Intelligence Activities of the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement 
and Disability System and for Other Purposes,” 4 May 2000, 5.  This report can be found at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/T?&report=sr279&dbname=cp106& (accessed August 2005).  
Hereafter referred to as “Senate Report 106-279.” 
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“ensure that this community works as an integrated, unified, cost-effective enterprise…to 
provide the President, his cabinet, the armed services, and the Congress with the best 
possible intelligence product – both current and strategic – on a regular basis.”11   
Significant changes within the various intelligence collection disciplines must 
occur in order to provide more insight into North Korea’s unconventional weapons 
programs.  A restructured Intelligence Community will place an increased focus on 
HUMINT to gain information.  Although this is not an easy task by any means, 
HUMINT-derived information can provide keen insight into North Korea’s capabilities 
and intentions on their weapons programs.  President Bush recently ordered the CIA to 
increase the number of spies by fifty percent and to double the number of agents in the 
research and development department tracking weapons of mass destruction.12  A new 
emphasis on open source intelligence (OSINT) will hopefully give analysts a better 
perception of the inner workings of North Korea from what is disseminated through its 
media outlets.  IMINT and SIGINT analysts in a restructured Intelligence Community 
may have the most difficult challenge.  As a result of a recently passed bill in the House 
of Representatives will make NGA and NSA work even harder to uncover information on 
North Korea’s numerous hard and deeply buried targets.  The 2006 Intelligence 
Authorization Bill decreases or eliminates funding for a small amount of extremely 
expensive satellite programs.  Congressional critics of the satellite programs claim that 
the programs “have been set on a ‘disastrous path’ of delays and overspending by 
mismanagement and ‘sloppy performance,’”13  so these programs must be curtailed.  
Additionally, from a legal standpoint, the revamped Intelligence Community will have to 
push the envelope in terms of what they are allowed to do within the confines of legality.  
To gain knowledge of North Korea’s most coveted military and government secrets, the 
 
11 John D. Negroponte, Statement Before The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Nomination 
Hearing of Ambassador John D. Negroponte to be Director of National Intelligence, 12 April 2005, 1.  A 
copy of the statement can be accessed at http://intelligence.senate.gov/0504hrg/ 050412/negroponte.pdf 
(accessed August 2005). 
12 “Bush Tells CIA to Get More Spies,” AP Online News Service, 27 November 2004, 
http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/afp/20041127/ts_alt_afp/us_attacks_intelligence_041127170
956 (accessed July 2005).   
13
 Shaun Waterman, “House Cuts Intelligence Satellite Funds,” UPI Online News Service, 11 July 
2005, http://washingtontimes.com/national/20050710-110049-3641r.htm (accessed July 2005). 
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Intelligence Community will have to explore all avenues to gain access to information, 
and that may entail going closer to the line of legality than we ever have before.   
The key cog in many of the intelligence reform initiatives is the intelligence 
analyst.  The United States must ensure that intelligence analysts have the tools necessary 
to effectively and efficiently complete the intelligence mission.  Current initiatives within 
intelligence analysis are also being designed to ensure the credibility and reliability of the 
analytical products as to avoid the faulty intelligence analysis seen in the Iraq WMD 
scenario.  New procedures that encourage differing analytical assessments instead of 
waiting for or pushing for community consensus on tough issues will go a long way to 
gaining a better overall understanding of the North Korea unconventional weapons 
problem.  The challenge with today’s Intelligence Community is that it is difficult trying 
to coordinate analytical efforts between fifteen different intelligence agencies and 
organizations, all with varying missions and customers.   
Intelligence reform efforts should ensure that collaboration and cooperation 
between analysts and agencies is easier to do; the mindset of the Intelligence Community 
must change from a mantra of “need to know” to one of “need to share.”  Collaboration 
will lead to filling in the intelligence gaps that exist on the North Korean problem set by 
reducing the duplication of effort of varying agencies and increasing unity of effort to 
come up with sound solutions that can be used by military and civilian decisionmakers.  
Once the analysts gather the information, analyze it, and tailor it into actionable 
intelligence, they must be given the opportunity to present that information to decision-
makers.  Evidence suggests that some policymakers failed to listen to warnings from 
intelligence experts regarding how the Coalition forces would be greeted upon their 
arrival after the liberation of Iraq.14  This issue is an example of the serious credibility 
problem that exists for the Intelligence Community.  Decisionmakers must trust that the 
intelligence they are receiving is good intelligence.  There must also be a better 




 Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Lessons of the Iraq War: Summary Briefing,” Center for 
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 10
ensure the right information gets to the right people at the right time.  Efforts to ensure 
more collaboration throughout the Intelligence Community will help to solve this 
problem.   
If the Intelligence Community continues to have credibility problems, 
policymakers will not listen when the next crisis occurs and make decisions based on 
faulty or non-existent intelligence.  A lack of credibility within the Intelligence 
Community could potentially have devastating effects on national security in a North 
Korea scenario, and every effort must be made to correct this problem immediately.  By 
looking at intelligence reforms through the lens of collection, analysis, and collaboration, 
I will show how these changes within the Intelligence Community could lead to better 
insight on the North Korea WMD program, ultimately furthering the goal of gaining 
more awareness of North Korea’s overall capabilities and intentions.  The case of Libya 
serves as a solid example of gaining quality intelligence on a country’s WMD program.  
Accurate intelligence allowed the United States to compel Libya to cease its WMD 
efforts.  The more that is known about the DPRK unconventional weapons program, the 
better chance the United States has in possibly getting North Korea to one day follow 
Libya’s example and dismantle its dangerous program. 
E. CONCLUSION 
As stated earlier, the North Korea situation is not an easy one to decipher.  
Chapter V will review the main findings and implications of the thesis, again looking at 
the reforms in three major categories of intelligence collection, analysis, and 
collaboration.  I will also conclude by briefly postulating that intelligence reform, while a 
good start, might not be enough to gain a better sense of North Korea and their intentions 
towards the United States and the international community. The second part to gaining a 
better understanding of the North Korea problem set is to look at the strategy and policy 
currently in place from the viewpoint of the Intelligence Community.  The United States 
has a number of strategy options to deal with this growing threat in North Korea.  
Coercive diplomacy, preemptive or preventive war, economic sanctions, or status quo are 
all options that the United States has at it disposal.  These strategy options that are of a 
negative persuasion have proved to be ineffective thus far, and further push the DPRK 
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into isolation.  A strategy based on these options may not adequately address the critical 
issues at stake on the peninsula and beyond, in light the intelligence gaps that exist on 
North Korea’s WMD program.   This is certainly not to insinuate that intelligence creates 
policy.  But in the case of North Korea, intelligence could benefit from a different policy 
that what is currently being executed. 
A strategy of engagement with North Korea could help the Intelligence 
Community to more effectively use the resources at its disposal to understand the 
capabilities and intentions of Kim Chong-il’s regime.  The most important part of 
developing an engagement strategy with North Korea is that engagement will have the 
added benefit of helping provide intelligence access to uncover North Korea’s 
unconventional weapons assets.  If the insular North Korea comes into the light of the 
international community, the United States and its coalition partners will be able to be in 
a better position to reduce the amount of intelligence gaps that exist on North Korea and 
its military capability.  As we become better able to understand the North Korea threat 
with good intelligence, policymakers will be able to refine the strategy, which can lead to 
more comprehensive and fruitful relations with North Korea, and a more stable 
international community.   
Finally, I will conclude the thesis by briefly looking at some of the other 
challenges that face the Intelligence Community, such as Iran, the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT), and weapons proliferation.  As DNI Negroponte stated regarding the 
Intelligence Community, “even if we cannot know every fact or predict every threat, by 
working more closely and effectively as a team, we can be more specific about what we 
do not know, and this is critical…it’s the only way we can pinpoint gaps in our 
knowledge and find ways to fill them.”15  I will examine how the intelligence reforms 
discussed in this thesis might have an effect on these other complex problem sets that the 
Intelligence Community has to solve. 
The critical importance of intelligence in warfare has rarely been disputed.  
Gaining an advantage over our adversaries is of the utmost importance.  As stated in the 
 
15 Negroponte, 5. 
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2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, “intelligence – and how we use it – 
is our first line of defense against terrorists and the threat posed by hostile states.”16  The 
difficulty in combating terrorism and other emerging threats like North Korea lies in the 
fact that the Intelligence Community has had difficulty transforming from a single enemy 
focus in the bipolar world of the Cold War era to a world with multiple dangerous nation-
states with nuclear aspirations, terrorist groups that use asymmetric warfare, and 
mounting homeland security issues.  The sheer volume of information now available to 
intelligence professionals to collect, analyze, and disseminate to military and policy 
decisionmakers to keep the nation, its military forces, and its allies safe only makes this 
Intelligence Community transformation task more problematic. Time will tell if the 
reform effort will take root within the Intelligence Community.  However, the current 
intelligence reforms designed to make the Intelligence Community a more effective 
entity should help the United States to gain a better sense of what the true state of the 
DRPK unconventional weapons program is, thus preventing another Iraqi WMD failure – 
a failure that could ultimately cost numerous American and coalition lives and could have 






16 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, DC, 
September 2002, 30.  Hereafter referred to as National Security Strategy 2002. A copy can be found at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (accessed July 2005). 
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II. THE NORTH KOREAN WMD THREAT: IT IS REAL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The date is March 2007 – intelligence reports state that the North Korea military 
has been engaging in an unprecedented level of combined exercises in the midst of its 
winter training cycle.  The exercises have continued for almost a week.  This strikes the 
Intelligence Community as odd because there have been no reports of any type of 
combined training for almost 10 years.  IMINT has uncovered some increased activity at 
the Yongbyon nuclear facility, which has been active for the last two years after the last 
failed round of six-party talks in July 2005.  Additional intelligence reporting has 
chronicled the continued decline of Kim Chong-il’s health after suffering a stroke the 
previous year.  He has stated numerous times that he wanted to see “a unified Korea 
under one rule by whatever means necessary” before his death.   
The United States military responded to the increased activity in North Korea by 
deploying additional forces to the region as a show of force.  Repeated efforts from the 
United States and the rest of the international community to ease tensions on the 
peninsula have been unsuccessful.  Combined U.S. Air Force and Navy exercises were 
conducted in response to North Korea’s continued military activity, and Army and 
Marine Corps units were sent to reinforce the demilitarized zone.  A SIGINT intercept 
revealed that Kim Chong-il informed his military commanders that “victory against the 
imperialist aggressors will come at any cost” and that a “grand surprise awaits the 
imperialists.” Attempts to corroborate the SIGINT with human HUMINT information 
proved unsuccessful since HUMINT sources in the isolationist country had decreased by 
more than fifty percent over the last few years.  Interrogation of a North Korean nuclear 
scientist who defected to the United Kingdom in 2006 had turned up little information of 
significant intelligence value.  North Korea increased the political rhetoric, insisting to 
the international community that any actions taken by North Korea were done solely in 
self-defense in response to aggressive posturing from the United States and its allies.  The 
United Nations (UN) urged all parties to use restraint during the crisis.   
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In early November 2007, on a routine air reconnaissance patrol, an American U-2 
plane was targeted by the radar of a North Korea surface-to-air missile system.  The 
North Koreans did not fire at the U-2, but the North Koreans claimed that the U-2 had 
invaded its sovereign airspace.  The United States and its allies took this action as an 
aggressive attempt on the part of the North Koreans to escalate the conflict.  The United 
States urged the U.N. to take action against the rogue nation before the conflict reached a 
point of no return.  The North Korean military continued their exercises, began to move 
an unusual amount of firepower into the demilitarized zone (DMZ), and called up its 
military reserve forces.  The U.N., led by the United States, South Korea, and the United 
Kingdom, gave North Korea seven days to stand down its military exercises, its 
provocative activity at the Yongbyon facility, and return ground troops at the DMZ back 
to garrison locations.  On the fourth day of the ultimatum, three United States and South 
Korean military hospitals reported seeing military and civilian patients with skin 
irritations and blisters that had been bothering them for a couple of days.  That same day, 
two Air Force sergeants working on the flightline of a coalition airbase reported to the 
hospital complaining of flu-like symptoms with sore throat, muscle aches, and fever.  
Over the next two days, they rapidly developed severe respiratory problems and fell into 
shock.  The two sergeants died on the sixth day of the U.N. ultimatum.  Military and 
civilian bio-weapons analysts finally determined that three military facilities in South 
Korea and one installation in Japan had been attacked with anthrax.  The official cause of 
death of the two sergeants was listed as severe internal bleeding from inhalation anthrax.  
Intelligence reporting surmised that North Korean special operations forces had 
infiltrated into the southern peninsula and into Japan and launched an anthrax attack on 
the four military facilities. 
As the news of the deaths of the two sergeants was leaked to the press, panic 
throughout the peninsula began to ensue.  Military and civilian medical clinics were 
besieged by hundreds of personnel claiming to have symptoms consistent with an anthrax 
attack.  All bases immediately went to chemical warfare preparations.  One of the bases 
responsible for launching offensive operations against the north found over fifty percent 
of their operations personnel either in the clinic with inhalation and cutaneous anthrax 
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symptoms or tending to dependents and family members with the same symptoms.  
Military operations over the next three days at all four bases slowed to minimal capacity.  
Over forty percent of military personnel supporting offensive operations had been 
hospitalized for possible exposure to anthrax spores; thirty pilots and six flag-level 
officers were among the casualties.  Hospitals began to run out of antibiotics that were 
being used to treat those exhibiting symptoms of anthrax exposure.  Reinforcements were 
deployed to the peninsula and Japan to help augment those injured.  Military dependents 
on the peninsula were evacuated as the number of casualties from the chemical attacks 
rose to two hundred military and civilian personnel.  Intelligence reports described a 
massing of North Korean troops all along the DMZ.  However, coalition forces found it 
increasingly difficult to prepare for military operations against North Korea because of 
the limited amount of mission-ready personnel available for duty.  Major cities on the 
Korean peninsula began to evacuate its citizens causing widespread chaos and clogging 
the transportation infrastructure.  In anticipation of hostilities, North Korean refugees 
began crossing the northern border into China, causing the Chinese government to begin 
closing the border and prevent refugees from entering the country.  Public opinion 
regarding an alleged chemical weapons attack by the North Koreans was interestingly 
split between outrage at the North Koreans and frustration with the United Nations and 
the rest of the international community for failure to do anything sooner about the North 
Korean situation.   
This fictional scenario could easily become reality in today’s international 
climate.  Most analysts would agree that a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack on 
American and allied facilities and personnel would have devastating consequences and 
would have repercussions that would be felt around the world.  The North Korean 
unconventional weapons threat is a serious threat that poses dangerous risks to the United 
States and its allies in the Pacific region.  As stated in the 2005 National Defense Strategy 
of the United States of America, 
Problem states will continue to undermine regional stability and threaten 
United States interests.  These states are hostile to United States principles. 




                                                
forces, or extremist clients.  They often disregard international law and 
violate international agreements.  Problem states may seek WMD or other 
destabilizing military capabilities.17 
This danger is reinforced in the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, “WMD - nuclear, biological, and chemical - in the possession of hostile 
states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United 
States.”18  With regards to North Korea’s WMD program, there are many intelligence 
gaps that prevent the United States from understanding North Korea’s capabilities and 
intentions for its unconventional weapons.  This makes military planning and 
counterproliferation efforts more challenging.  This chapter will discuss what is known 
about North Korea’s nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons program and uncover the 
answer to why this poses such a difficult challenge for the Intelligence Community.   
B. NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM 
The origins of the current crisis date back to December 2002.  That month, North 
Korea announced that it planned to restart the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon (see Figure 
1), effectively ending its participation in the 1994 United States-North Korea Agreed 
Framework.  The Agreed Framework committed North Korea to dismantle its nuclear 
program in return for diplomatic and economic incentives for the isolationist country.  
The Agreed Framework was considered a success by many because North Korea’s 
nuclear program was frozen for eight years from 1994 until the crisis began in December 
2002.19   However, when the agreement was finally signed, there was a lack of consensus 
within the Intelligence Community on how many weapons North Korea actually was 




17 The National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the United States of America, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD), Washington DC.  March 2005, 4, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/ 
d20050318nds1.pdf (accessed August 2005).  Hereafter referred to as National Defense Strategy 2005. 
18 The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002, 1.  Available at 
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf (accessed August 2005). 
19 Randall E. Newham, “Nukes for Sale Cheap?  Purchasing Peace with North Korea,” International 
Studies Perspectives 5, no. 2 (May 2004), 170. 
 Figure 1.   Yongbyon Nuclear Facility, North Korea20 
 
separated enough plutonium for anywhere from one to five nuclear weapons.21  By the 
time the crisis had begun, intelligence reports stated North Korea had covertly attempted 
to acquire an uranium enrichment program (see Figure 2), and had been trying to do so 
for over two years, clearly in violation of the Agreed Framework.22  North Korea has 
publicly refuted those claims.  In January 2003, North Korea informed the IAEA and the 
U.N. Security Council that Pyongyang was withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty.  There was still much debate within the intelligence community on what type of 
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22
 Joseph Cirincione, et al, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Threats, Revised 
Edition (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 282. 
 
nuclear capability North Korea possessed.  Three months later, North Korea publicly 
stated it possessed nuclear weapons, threatening the possibility of exporting nuclear 
materials.   
 
 
Figure 2.   Suspected North Korean Uranium Enrichment Sites23 
 
An explosion in North Korea in September 2004 fueled speculation around the 
world for several days that the country had conducted some type of nuclear test.  
Although the blast at the site was not determined to be a nuclear explosion, the lack of 
clear and timely information regarding the incident brought to light the intelligence gaps 
that existed for North Korea’s unconventional weapons program, especially the nuclear 
question.  In October 2004, North Korea announced it had completed the reprocessing of 
the 8,000 spent fuel rods that were previously watched under IAEA safeguards, 
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23 Nuclear Threat Initiative, August 2005.  Map available at 
http://www.nti.org/db/profiles/dprk/nuc/nuc_ overview.html#maps (accessed August 2005).     
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potentially giving North Korea an additional 25-30 kilograms of plutonium, which is 
enough material to produce between four and six atomic bombs.24 
After more than a year of rhetoric and failed negotiation attempts between the 
United States and North Korea, the rogue state announced in February 2005 that it had 
officially developed nuclear weapons.  Speculation on North Korea’s nuclear capability 
continued when Vice Admiral Jacoby, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, 
testified in front of the Senate Arms Services Committee in April 2005 that North Korea 
had the ability to arm its Taepo Dong-2 long range missile with a nuclear warhead.  
Intelligence estimates state that the Taepo Dong-2 missile could possibly have the range 
to reach the continental United States.  Although there is considerable support within the 
Intelligence Community for the theory that North Korea has successfully miniaturized a 
nuclear warhead for a missile, the consensus view remains that North Korea is years 
away from having the capability to put a nuclear warhead on a missile.25  The differing 
assessments within the Intelligence Community on the North Korean problem set proves 
that there are still numerous intelligence gaps that need to be filled in order to get a better 
a overall picture of the threat.   
Much has been made of the reasons behind North Korea’s nuclear strategy.  It is 
difficult to discern the true nature of their nuclear intentions, mostly because there is little 
known of their actual nuclear capabilities.  This is a significant intelligence gap that must 
eventually be solved.  One theory is that the intent of North Korea’s nuclear strategy is to 
increase pressure on the United States to strike a non-aggression pact or some type of 
new nuclear agreement that would provide new economic benefits to North Korea.  
Although it is unlikely that North Korea would launch a surprise nuclear attack on the 




24 Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” Congressional Research Service, 
The Library of Congress, 3, June 2005, 10. 
25 Bradley Graham and Glenn Kessler, “N. Korean Nuclear Advance Is Cited,” Washington Post 
Online News Service, 29 April 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/04/28/ 
AR2005042802113.html (accessed August 2005).   
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nuclear program as leverage to extract economic or material concessions from the United 
States.  This appears to be the strategy used by North Korea at the latest six-party 
negotiation talks.   
Another theory is that North Korea is engaging in a much more aggressive and 
calculated strategy to achieve its goals.  This new strategy has three objectives: 
(1) abolish the Bush Administration’s proposal of June 23, 2004 (which called for 
a quick dismantlement of North Korea’s plutonium and uranium enrichments 
programs after a three month preparatory period), as a basis for negotiations on 
the nuclear issue, 
(2) establish a long-term diplomatic stalemate on the nuclear issue that will last at 
least through the second Bush Administration, and 
(3) condition other governments to accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons 
state.26 
On the other side of the negotiation table, the Bush administration’s current policy 
towards North Korea includes the following aspects:   
(1) termination of the 1994 Agreed Framework,  
(2) no negotiating with North Korea until it dismantles its nuclear program, 
demanding that they take steps to ensure the complete, verifiable, irreversible 
dismantlement of its nuclear programs, both the plutonium program and the secret 
uranium enrichment program, 
(3) assembling an international coalition to apply economic pressure on North 
Korea,  
(4) planning for future economic sanctions military interdiction of North Korea 
shipping and air traffic through a Proliferation Security Initiative.27  
 
26 Niksch, 2. 
27 Ibid., 1. 
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The Bush administration has also previously stated that all options to resolve the 
situation remain on the planning table, to include military options.  However, it is only 
recently that the United States has placed a priority on resolving the North Korean 
nuclear crisis, and a quick glance at the two divergent strategies shows that the two sides 
are far from reaching any type of meaningful resolution to the crisis.   
North Korea is well aware that it does not have the military firepower to defeat 
the United States in a confrontation.  From the North Korean vantage point, nuclear 
weapons can be an effective deterrent to the overwhelming superiority of the United 
States.  If other nations were to ultimately accept North Korea as a nuclear power, 
Pyongyang would gain legitimacy in the international community, causing rifts between 
the United States and its allies, much like the rifts that developed between the United 
States and Europe in the months leading up to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).  As 
more time passes without a resolution to the nuclear crisis, North Korea can and will use 
that time to develop its nuclear weapons and associated facilities, as well as drive a 
wedge between the United States and its coalition partners.   
C. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM  
While there are numerous questions about the nuclear program, the North 
Koreans have a formidable chemical and biological weapons program from what is 
known thus far through open sources and defector reports (see Figure 3).  Pyongyang’s 
chemical and biological weapons also pose as an effective deterrent to offset the military 
advantage of the United States.  With a focus on V-series agents, sarin, and mustard, 
North Korea can produce 4,500 tons of chemical agents in peacetime, 12,000 tons in 
wartime, and have a stockpile of anywhere from 2,500 to 5,000 tons of chemical 
agents.28  As outlined in the fictional scenario above, a North Korean chemical attack on 
friendly forces in the operating area would have significant consequences for the North 
Koreans and for the numerous military and civilian victims of an attack.  It is assessed 
that North Korea would use chemical weapons in a military confrontation against the 
United States and its allies to disrupt operations and cause chaos amongst the civilian 
 
28 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Unconventional 
Weapons,” in Planning the Unthinkable, ed. Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 2000), 191. 
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populace.  The three most likely scenarios in which North Korea would use chemical 
weapons are 1) a United States-led military operation against North Korea, 2) an attempt 
by the North Koreans to reunify the peninsula (in which it would execute an intense 
attack posture to quickly take the peninsula before friendly forces could respond and 
retaliate), and 3) a last resort effort if the Kim Chong-il regime was on the verge of 
collapse.29 
Probably more dangerous than North Korea’s chemical weapons is its biological 
weapons arsenal.  A recently released report from the State Department assesses that 
North Korea possesses a “dedicated, national-level effort to achieve a biological weapon 
capability and has developed and produced, and may have weaponized, biological 
weapon agents in violation of the [Biological and Toxin Weapons] Convention.”30  Its 
arsenal includes smallpox, anthrax, botulism, cholera, plague, yellow fever, hemorrhagic 
fever, and typhoid.  However, North Korea may be focusing more on a defensive 
biological capability as opposed to an offensive one.  Pyongyang has not focused on 
offensive biological warfare because of its limited biotechnology capabilities, and 
because of its limited biomedical capabilities, which could prove problematic for the 
protection of its own soldiers in the event of an offensive biological attack.31  North 
Korea could use biological weapons in similar fashion to chemical weapons, using them 
as a last resort in the face of defeat, or prior to hostilities to cause chaos within the 
military and civilian populace in South Korea and Japan.  Despite the available 
information, the fact remains that there still are significant intelligence gaps that exist on 
the North Korean biological and chemical weapons program, gaps that must be filled in 
order for the United States to prepare for this threat. 
 
 
29 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Unconventional 
Weapons,” in Planning the Unthinkable, ed. Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 2000), 196. 
30 U.S. State Department, Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and 
Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, Bureau of Verification and Compliance, Washington, DC, 30 
August 2005, 27. A copy of this report can be found at http://www.state.gov/t/vc/rls/rpt/51977.htm 
(accessed September 2005). 
31 Bermudez, 191. 
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Figure 3.   North Korean Chemical and Biological Facilities32 
 
The North Koreans also have the means to deliver all the elements of the WMD 
program throughout the Pacific region and possibly beyond, threatening United States 
and allied interests.  Pyongyang could choose to deliver its unconventional weapons 
arsenal via a variety of modes, such as aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, 
artillery, ballistic missiles, or via its special operations forces.  In anticipation of possible 
WMD activity in the event of hostilities, the North Korean regime has been preparing its 
citizens for such a contingency, distributing gas masks to the entire country back in 1992.  
From what is known thus far, the North Koreans appear to have a dangerous WMD 
arsenal at its disposal and are prepared to use it in the event of a confrontation with the 
United States.   
D. INTELLIGENCE CHALLENGES 
Despite all of this information, significant intelligence gaps remain regarding the 
North Korean unconventional weapons program.  Much of the information that we 
possess on North Korea’s capabilities is ambiguous at best.  As explained earlier, this 
program constitutes a threat to American military forces and civilian personnel on the 
Korean peninsula.  So why does the unconventional weapons program of North Korea 
 
32 Nuclear Threat Initiative, August 2005.  Map available at 
http://www.nti.org/db/profiles/dprk/nuc/nuc_ overview.html#maps (accessed August 2005). 
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pose such a challenge to the Intelligence Community?  One of the main reasons is that 
North Korea is an insular, closed society, making it difficult to gain timely and accurate 
intelligence data.  The North Koreans are governed by an ideology of “chuch’e” or self-
reliance.  This self-reliance entails the rejection of dependence on other countries and the 
espousing of one’s own strengths.  The “chuch’e” ideology relates directly to North 
Korea’s governmental goals of an independent foreign policy, a self-sufficient economy, 
and a self-reliant defense posture.33  Although North Korea has received considerable 
amounts of aid, food, and weaponry from members of the international community 
including the United States, it remains steadfast in its self-reliance doctrine.   
If the country remains isolationist, there will certainly be intelligence limitations 
that prevent the Intelligence Community from fully understanding the North Korean 
threat.  Because of its insular nature, its tight control of the media, and its travel 
restrictions on its citizens, there is only so much open source intelligence (OSINT) that 
exists on North Korea.  Intelligence analysts must be careful when evaluating North 
Korean OSINT, because much of it can be labeled as propaganda from the Kim Chong-il 
regime, while some open source information from North Korea is disseminated to the 
international community with the intent on deceiving its true motives. 
The more technical forms of intelligence also have difficult challenges when 
dealing with North Korea’s WMD program.  North Korea has developed thousands of 
hard and deeply buried targets (HDBT) over the years to prepare for military operations 
against South Korea and the United States.  The worldwide proliferation of these HDBTs 
is particularly troublesome in places like North Korea, where the country is pursuing 
unconventional weapons and protecting the associated delivery systems through a variety 
of hardening and deeply burying techniques.34  North Korea’s HDBTs have been 
designed to protect critical nodes that are of importance to Kim Chong-il’s regime, such 
 
33 “North Korea’s Political Ideology: The Role of Chuch'e,” Library of Congress Online Research 
Tool, June 1993, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgibin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field (DOCID+kp0108) (accessed 
August 2005). 
34 Michael J. Morgan, “The Bunker-Busting Nuke:  Essential Capability or Destabilizing Weapon?”  
National Defense University, National War College, 2002, 
http://www.ndu.edu/library/n2/n02MorganBunker.doc (accessed August 2005), 3. 
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as leadership command bunkers, command and control assets, and WMD facilities.  The 
presence of HDBTs in North Korea poses an extremely difficult intelligence challenge.  It 
is assessed that numerous tunnels in North Korea are over 300 feet deep, are wide enough 
to allow the passage of heavy equipment, and can support the movement of 
approximately 8,000 troops per hour during combat operations against South Korea.35  
IMINT and measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT) both have significant 
limitations in trying to locate, fix, and target these HDBTs, since it is difficult to know 
where the targets are located because of concealment efforts.  As a result, it becomes 
problematic to hold these targets at risk with precision weapons.  Additionally, even if 
North Korean HDBTs were located, weapon effectiveness would be limited because of 
how deep the targets are.  It would be extremely difficult to determine weapon 
effectiveness or battle damage assessment with imagery and MASINT, because deeply 
buried targets could still be operational even if entranceways or exits have been attacked 
with weapons.  If timely IMINT and MASINT is not gathered on North Korean HDBTs 
prior to hostilities, coalition forces run the risk of being unable to determine where 
critical nodes are located in order for them to be targeted.  IMINT and MASINT also 
have the additional challenge of trying to locate and target the various mobile missile 
systems that will be hidden in bunkers and then deployed to deliver unconventional 
weapons.   
The art of SIGINT against a target like North Korea also has its difficulties.  
North Korea is known for keeping tight control over its communication outlets, which 
would be susceptible to intercept by the United States signals intelligence apparatus.  
Kim Chong-il’s regime maintains a strict control over all broadcast and other 
communications systems in North Korea, monitoring all outgoing and incoming foreign 
transmissions, including overseas telephone calls.36  This makes it difficult to collect 
intelligence on North Korea’s activities to uncover its capabilities and intentions.  It is 
 
35 Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korean Special Forces (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 
1998), 251, in Michael J. Morgan, “The Bunker-Busting Nuke: Essential Capability or Destabilizing 
Weapon?”  National Defense University, National War College, 2002, 3.  A copy of this article can be 
found at http://www.ndu.edu/library/n2/n02MorganBunker.doc (accessed August 2005). 
36 Desmond Ball, “Signals Intelligence in North Korea,” Jane's Intelligence Review 8, Issue 1 (January 
1996), 1. 
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assessed that North Korea also places great importance on protecting its signal emissions 
while trying to prevent its adversaries from using their signals intelligence network.  The 
strategy to deceive signals intelligence collection consists of control of electronic 
emissions by total or partial radio silence, maximum reduction of emissions by use of 
directional antennas and low-power outputs, and electronic deception accomplished by 
transmitting false traffic to deceive the enemy.37  So if the enemy restricts the majority of 
its communications and signals emissions, friendly forces are going to have extreme 
difficulty in collecting information and quality intelligence against the adversary.   
Human intelligence also has severe limitations in combating the North Korean 
unconventional weapons threat.  Again, because of its insular nature, gathering useful 
information through human intelligence sources is difficult.  It is not easy to place spies, 
agents, or even foreign travelers into an isolated country like North Korea, nor is it easy 
to train a person to blend into a closed society.  In addition to North Korea being an 
insular nation, there are two other main reasons for the lack of human intelligence on 
Kim Chong-il’s regime.  One reason is that the United States does not have diplomatic 
relations with North Korea, thus there is no embassy or consulate in the country.  The 
lack of diplomatic presence prevents the United States from having access to information 
that can be gleaned from personnel stationed at an embassy, like in other places around 
the world with an American diplomatic mission.  A second reason is that the Intelligence 
Community has been relatively unsuccessful in befriending North Koreans living in 
Japan and who belong to nationalist groups such as the Chosen Soren.38  Intelligence 
gained from those sources would provide excellent insight into the North Korean society, 
but the small number of North Korean who can travel abroad are considered loyal to the 
North Korean regime and may be unreliable as intelligence sources.  
The difficulties with human intelligence on North Korea lead into a related issue, 
adding to the question of why the North Korean WMD problem set is so challenging.  
There are inherent problems with the sharing of intelligence information between the 
 
37 Desmond Ball, “Signals Intelligence in North Korea,” Jane's Intelligence Review 8, Issue 1 (January 
1996), 10. 
38 Jeremy Kirk, “Intel Experts: N. Korea a ‘Hard Target,’” Global Security Online Service, 21 March 
2004, http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2004/040321-dprk-target.htm (accessed August 2005). 
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United States and its allies in the Pacific area of operations.  The United States has often 
had difficulty gaining information on North Korea because of strained intelligence 
agency relations with the South Koreans.  South Korea is known for its strength in human 
intelligence that is acquired from defectors, intelligence which is critical to gaining 
information on North Korea’s WMD program.39  However, the United States remains 
frustrated with South Korea for failing to provide access to defectors in a timely manner.  
Intelligence analysts say fast and full access to defectors is crucial to uncovering the 
extent of North Korea’s nuclear program and the rest of its unconventional weapons 
program.   
Relations between the United States and China have also become strained as a 
result of the North Korean problem set.  The United States wants China to take a more 
definitive and assertive role in the six-party talks, stating that this issue will have lasting 
effects on them most directly if not dealt with immediately.  North Korea’s strongest ally 
during the nuclear crisis, China has been criticized by the United States for not doing 
more to convince North Korea to agree to dismantle its nuclear program.  It is unclear 
what China’s goals are in the North Korean issue, but possible objectives are: 1) the 
management of bilateral relations with North Korea, as long as North Korean policy 
allows for an active Chinese role, 2) ensuring a credible and growing relationship with 
South Korea for developmental and security reasons, 3) collaboration and competition in 
relation to United States regional policies, and 4) encouraging a more limited role for 
other major powers such as Russia and Japan.40    A destabilized North Korea would have 
serious implications for China’s role in the region.  A critical influx of refugees across the 
border could pose serious economic problems for China if the North Korean government 
were to collapse.  Additionally, a destabilized North Korea could create uncertainty over 
control of North Korea’s unconventional weapons, which could be covertly transported 
 
39 Donald Kirk, “Rift seen in S. Korean and US intelligence sharing,” Christian Science Monitor 
Online, 11 March 2004.  Article can be found at http://www2.gol.com/users/coynerhm/ 
rift_seen_in_skkorean_and_us_intel.htm (accessed August 2005). 
40 Jonathan D.  Pollack, “China and a Changing North Korea: Issues, Uncertainties, and 
Implications?”  North Korea’s Engagement—Perspectives, Outlook, and Implications Conference Report, 
National Intelligence Council, 23 February 2001, http://www.fas.org/irp/nic/nk_conference.html (accessed 
August 2005). 
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through China or to non-state elements that could use the weapons against China or other 
nations in the Pacific region.41  Despite the importance of this issue that resides in 
China’s backyard, Beijing has not shown much urgency in solving the North Korean 
problem.  As a result, the United States is reluctant to share critical intelligence with a 
pseudo-ally who may or may not share the same long term goals in solving this issue.  
Nor is the United States receiving any intelligence of value from China because of its 
refusal to compromise its relationship with North Korea. 
Interestingly, China has also been developing stronger ties to South Korea, which 
does not bode well for the relationship between South Korean and the United States.  As 
South Korea has been steadily moving closer to China in the last few years due to 
economic and political reasons, relations with the United States have taken a turn for the 
worse.  This move towards China presents a new challenge in the South Korean alliance.  
If the Chinese/South Korean relationship continues to grow, the United States will be 
even more reluctant to share intelligence on the North Korean problem with South Korea, 
for fear that Seoul will immediately pass that information on to the Chinese.  North Korea 
will also not welcome the fact that its staunchest ally is growing closer to its adversary 
across the DMZ, further throwing the peninsula into a state of convoluted relationships, 
and sending North Korea further into isolation and shutting off avenues for understanding 
Pyongyang’s WMD capabilities and intentions.   
Japan also has a stake in the resolution of the North Korean situation, as it 
remains concerned about the intentions of North Korea towards its country.  Relations 
between North Korea, South Korea, China, and the United States have left Japan 
somewhat out on the periphery, even though the North Korean situation directly affects 
its national security.  Japan remains wary of North Korea after witnessing a launch of a 
North Korean Taepo Dong-1 missile over Japanese territory in August 1998.  But Japan 
believes that United States wrongly places emphasis on efforts to curtail North Korea’s 
long-range missile development, instead of addressing Japan’s more pressing concern 
 
41Andrew F. Diamond and Daniel A. Pinkston, “Don’t Outsource North Korea Problem to China,” The 
Korea Times Online News Service, 24 April 2005, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/pinkston_050425.htm 
(accessed August 2005). 
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with the immediate threat of North Korea’s forward deployed medium range ballistic 
missiles.42   North Korea could also find it necessary to attack Japan prior to hostilities 
with unconventional weapons to keep them from mobilizing against its forces.  Japan has 
also been asked to support the North Korean problem set economically and 
diplomatically, but has not received the same recognition that other countries have.  All 
of these factors lead to reluctance on the part of the Japanese to help the United States 
solve this problem by sharing intelligence on North Korea, which further widens the 
intelligence gaps on North Korea’s WMD program.   
E. CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the United States does not have the intelligence apparatus in place 
at this time to fully understand North Korea’s unconventional weapons threat.  Although 
there seems to be a fair amount of information available on Pyongyang’s WMD program, 
much of what we know comes from a varying amount of sources, many of which cannot 
be validated.  Too many intelligence gaps remain to be filled, despite the help of regional 
allies and despite the technological superiority of the United States.  The WMD threat 
from North Korea is of the utmost concern to the United States, and presents a difficult 
challenge.  The 2005 National Defense Strategy alludes to the North Korean WMD threat 
when it states, “Particularly troublesome [to the United States] is the nexus of 
transnational terrorists, proliferation, and problem states that possess or seek WMD, 
increasing the risk of WMD attack against the United States.  Proliferation of WMD 
technology and expertise makes contending with catastrophic challenges an urgent 
priority.”43   
The Intelligence Community is not sufficiently structured to provide the type of 
all-inclusive and detailed intelligence information and analysis necessary for the United 
States to deter threats such as North Korea’s unconventional weapons program, its 
nuclear capabilities, and its proliferation efforts.  The next chapter will discuss what 
reform efforts are occurring in the Intelligence Community to enhance its capabilities in 
 
42 “Engagement: Causes, Status, Outlook,” North Korea’s Engagement—Perspectives, Outlook, and 
Implications Conference Report, National Intelligence Council, 23 February 2001, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/nic/nk_ conference.html (accessed August 2005). 
43 National Defense Strategy 2005, 3. 
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today’s dynamic threat environment.  In 1998, the South Korean Foreign Ministry 
estimated two tons of poison gas used against unprotected civilians could kill over 
100,000 people and seriously injure another 60,000.44  If the situation remains 
unchanged, the United States, and in effect, the international community, will suffer the 
same problem in North Korea that was witnessed in Iraq with the faulty assessment of the 
existence of WMD.  Only this time, the political stakes will be much higher, as will the 




44 “North Korean Chemical and Biological Weapons Threats Elaborated,” CBW Chronicle, Vol. III, 
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III. INTELLIGENCE REFORM INITIATIVES  
Under this new law, our vast intelligence enterprise will become more 
unified, coordinated and effective. It will enable us to better do our duty, 
which is to protect the American people.45 
President George W. Bush, 17 December 
2004, signing the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there have been numerous calls from the White 
House, Congress, and various independent commissions to fundamentally restructure 
how the Intelligence Community operates.  Many senior governmental leaders are 
appropriately concerned that the Intelligence Community is not configured to protect the 
United States from threats posed from terrorist elements and rogue nation-states.  Needed 
Intelligence Community transformation should greatly improve the country’s ability to 
fully understand enemy intentions and capabilities so that U.S. decisionmakers and 
military warfighters can protect its citizens, and gain the strategic, operational, and 
tactical advantage over the adversaries.  Up until recently, the Intelligence Community 
has been operating in a Cold War mentality that has hampered its ability to go after the 
complex enemies in the international arena who have unconventional weapons, who 
move uncontested from country to country, and who are adept at fighting battles in an 
asymmetric manner.  Most agree that the Intelligence Community needs to become more 
aggressive and agile to understand the enemy, but what exactly is the Intelligence 
Community doing to enhance its effectiveness against the 21st century adversaries?   
There have been a number of initiatives proposed to transform the Intelligence 
Community, some of which have been outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy of 
the United States, the Department of Defense Transformation Goals, the 9/11 
Commission Report, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and 
 
45 “President Signs Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act,” Office of the White House 
Press Secretary Press Release, 17 December 2004.  Transcript available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2004/12/20041217-1.html (accessed August 2005). 
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the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons 
of Mass Destruction (referred to hereafter as WMD Commission).  The goal of these 
proposals and reform initiatives is to make the Intelligence Community and its fifteen 
intelligence agencies a more efficient and successful entity at the strategic, operational, 
and tactical levels.  This chapter will discuss in detail the some of the intelligence reform 
initiatives currently ongoing in the Intelligence Community and the following chapter 
will assess whether these initiatives will truly make the Intelligence Community more 
capable of understanding the scope, location, and components of the North Korean WMD 
threat.   Chapter III also takes an in depth look at the National Security Agency, examines 
how its extensive transformation efforts have postured the agency to be successful against 
today’s adversaries, and also shows how it is an excellent example for the rest of the 
Intelligence Community in this tumultuous time of change and reform. 
Recently, the concept of intelligence reform has been a hot political topic, 
developing into a significant issue in the 2004 presidential election.  However, 
intelligence reform is hardly a new concept, despite it being a popular topic recently in 
the media and around the Washington, DC beltway.  Long before the 9/11 attacks, 
attempts had been made to reform and improve the operation of the Intelligence 
Community.  Since 1948, there have been at least fourteen official studies and 
commissions that tried to make improvements in the Intelligence Community.  The most 
recent agent of intelligence reform, the WMD Commission, gave its report to the 
president in March 2005 on the failures of the Intelligence Community in uncovering 
Iraq’s WMD program.  They levied harsh criticism upon the Intelligence Community, 
calling the pre-war intelligence on Iraq’s unconventional weapons program “dead 
wrong.”  The commission ultimately offered seventy-four recommendations on how the 
Intelligence Community can be improved.  According to the commission’s report, the 
Iraq WMD failure was due to a number of critical factors:    
This failure was in large part the result of analytical shortcomings; 
intelligence analysts were too wedded to their assumptions about 
Saddam’s intentions.  But it was also a failure on the part of those who 
collect intelligence – the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) and the 
Defense Intelligence Agency’s spies, the National Security Agency’s 
(NSA) eavesdroppers, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency’s 
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(NGA) imagery experts.  In the end, those agencies collected precious 
little intelligence for the analysts to analyze, and much of what they did 
collect was either worthless or misleading. Finally, it was a failure to 
communicate effectively with policymakers; the Intelligence Community 
didn’t adequately explain just how little good intelligence it had—or how 
much its assessments were driven by assumptions and inferences rather 
than concrete evidence.46 
The critical question now is how the Intelligence Community can avoid repeating the 
gross mistakes that were made with the Iraq WMD program.  As a result of the 9/11 
Commission, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, and the WMD 
Commission, there are numerous reform initiatives taking place within the Intelligence 
Community today.  These initiatives should organize the Intelligence Community in such 
a way to prevent another Iraq WMD failure.  Due to the abundance of ongoing reform 
initiatives, this chapter will focus on the most important intelligence transformation 
initiatives that are currently being developed. These include the creation of the position of 
National Intelligence Director, horizontal integration, persistent surveillance, Intelligence 
Campaign Planning, newly created all-source intelligence centers, and specific reforms at 
the CIA, NGA, and NSA which will be elaborated upon later in the chapter.   
The 9/11 Commission delivered its recommendations on how to restructure and 
streamline the Intelligence Community to be more effective.  It reported that there was a 
severe lack of information sharing of terrorism-related intelligence, and that there was a 
lack of unity of effort within the Intelligence Community.  Some have called the 9/11 
Commission the most influential attempt to enact intelligence reform because of its 
overarching changes to the National Security Act of 1947.47  The commission offered 
five recommendations in regards to the Intelligence Community: 
 
46 The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass 
Destruction,   Report to the President of the United States, Washington, DC, 31 March 2005, 3.  A copy of 
the report can be found at http://www.wmd.gov/report/index.html (accessed August 2005).  Hereafter 
referred to as WMD Commission Report. 
47 Michael Warner and J. Kenneth McDonald, “U.S. Intelligence Community Reform Studies Since 
1947,” Center for the Study of Intelligence, Strategic Management Issues Office Washington, DC, April 
2005, iv.  Article available at http://www.cia.gov/csi/monograph/US%20Intelligence%2 
0Reform%20Studies/73531book.pdf (accessed August 2005). 
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1) unifying strategic intelligence and operational planning against Islamist 
terrorists across the foreign-domestic divide with a National Counterterrorism 
Center; 
2) unifying the intelligence community with a new National Intelligence Director; 
3) unifying the many participants in the counterterrorism effort and their 
knowledge in a network-based information sharing system that transcends 
traditional governmental boundaries; 
4) unifying and strengthening congressional oversight to improve quality and 
accountability; and  
5) strengthening the FBI and homeland defenders.48  
President Bush accepted many of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission when he 
signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act into law in December 2004.  
This discussion will focus primarily on the first three recommendations from the 9/11 
Commission. 
B. INTELLIGENCE REFORM INITIATIVES  
1. Establishment of the DNI 
One of the most controversial recommendations that came from the 9/11 
Commission was the appointing of a Cabinet-level National Intelligence Director who 
would consolidate and coordinate the efforts of the fifteen intelligence agencies and 
control their intelligence budgets.  The Act officially created the position of Director of 
National Intelligence, and President Bush selected John Negroponte, former United 
States Ambassador to Iraq, to serve as the first DNI.  Before the legislation was enacted, 
the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was multi-hatted as the overseer of the fifteen 
intelligence agencies, the head of the CIA, and the principal intelligence advisor to the 
president.  Despite this enormous responsibility, DoD controlled approximately 80 
percent of the intelligence budget.  The new DNI does not have the additional job of CIA 
 
48 The 9/11 Commission.  Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States, Executive Summary, Washington, DC, July 2004, 20-21.  The commission report can be 
found at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf (accessed August 2005).  Hereafter 
referred to as 9/11 Commission Report. 
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Director, which allows him to focus on the Intelligence Community as a whole and not be 
torn between the CIA and the rest of the community.  The new legislation gives the DNI 
budgetary power and authority over the Intelligence Community.  A DNI with budgetary 
power and authority over all the intelligence agencies will have a good chance of 
increasing cooperation and communication between the intelligence organizations.  Three 
former CIA Directors, Admiral Stansfield Turner, William Webster, and James Woolsey, 
came out in strong support of the recommendation for a National Intelligence Director.  
All three also agreed that the most important issue for the DNI will be control of the 
intelligence budget.  Webster further stated that “the designated leader must be clearly 
and unambiguously empowered to act…[and] control of the budget is essential to 
effective management of the intelligence community.”49      
There has already been some controversy between DoD and the Intelligence 
Community, as the DNI will have to work closely with the Pentagon in order to ensure 
goals for the community are not usurped by DoD.  Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has 
been vocal in his criticism of the DNI position because it may affect how DoD’s 
intelligence agencies operate.  Foreshadowing an impending rift between the DoD and 
the Intelligence Community on intelligence reform, he testified in front of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee in August 2004 and said that he reluctantly agreed with the 
idea for a DNI.  He urged Congress to be wary of implementing changes in the 
Intelligence Community too quickly while trying to prosecute the war on terrorism.  He 
stated that “I doubt that we should think of intelligence reform being completed in a 
single stroke…we need to remember that we are considering these important matters 
while we are waging a war - If we move unwisely and get it wrong, the penalty would be 
great.”50   The relationship between DoD and the DNI could prove to be contentious and 
must be watched closely.  Secretary Rumsfeld recently ordered Undersecretary of 
Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone to take the lead on DoD intelligence reform 
 
49 Brian Knowlton, “Ex-Chiefs of C.I.A. Back Key Point of 9/11 Report,” New York Times Online 
News Service, 16 August 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/16/politics/16CND-PANE.html?hp 
(accessed August 2005). 
50 Philip Shenon, “Rumsfeld Wary About Shuffling Spy Duties,” New York Times Online News 
Service, 18 August 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/18/politics/18panel.html?hp. (accessed August 
2005). 
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efforts.  These include plans focusing on resources, acquisition oversight, personnel 
management, security and the creation of any new national intelligence centers,51 which 
some interpreted as an early challenge to the DNI’s authority because some of these 
efforts fall within the DNI’s new domain. 
Cambone has been leading DoD’s intelligence transformation efforts in concert 
with the Intelligence Community.  DoD has highlighted six goals for intelligence 
transformation.  Those goals are as follows: 
1) know something of intelligence value about everything of interest to us, all the 
time; 
2) develop reliable strategic warning;  
3) pursue agile and adaptable intelligence collection and analysis capability; 
4) provide an intelligence capability that supports a national strategy of forward 
deterrence and agility; 
5) ensure military forces receive intelligence in a fashion and in a format that 
enables them to swiftly defeat an adversary; 
6) Ensure knowledgeable adversaries do not compromise our secrets.52  
In trying to attain these transformation goals, Cambone is placing high emphasis 
on three initiatives with the Intelligence Community, focusing horizontal integration, 
persistent surveillance, and intelligence campaign planning.   
2. Horizontal Integration and Persistent Surveillance 
Horizontal integration and persistent surveillance work in tandem with each other.  
Horizontal integration is the initiative to get the various agencies to share information 
with each other, and persistent surveillance is refining the ability to have continuous 
collection capability throughout all intelligence spectrums: air, ground, and space.  
 
51 Walter Pincus, “Rumsfeld Memo on Intelligence Criticized.”  Washington Post Online News 
Service, 8 April 2005,  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A35490-
2005Apr7.html?nav=hcmodule (accessed August 2005).  
52 Stephen A. Cambone, Testimony Before The Senate Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces 
Subcommittee, United States Congress, 7 April 2004, 4-5.  Transcript available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/ 2004_hr /040704cambone.pdf (accessed August 2005). 
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Horizontal integration will pose a big challenge – getting analysts who have been trained 
for years not to collaborate or share information to buy into the concept.  However, the 
benefits certainly outweigh the costs.   According to intelligence planners, the horizontal 
integration concept will “combine national security community assets into processes and 
capabilities that acquire, synchronize, correlate and deliver data of all types in a 
consumer-centric environment… geared toward understanding an adversary’s intentions 
and searching for links to capabilities and opportunities to thwart its efforts.”53 These two 
initiatives were detailed in April 2004 during a Senate Armed Services Strategic 
Subcommittee hearing by Cambone, who stated that the intelligence collected via 
persistent surveillance is “useless without having a basis for moving that 
information…and that’s why DoD is working so hard on horizontal integration.  [O]nce 
the information is moved, having an analytic cadre capable of analyzing that data and 
extracting knowledge from it is essential.”54   
3. Intelligence Campaign Planning 
Another aspect of intelligence transformation ongoing within the Intelligence 
Community and DoD is the development of Intelligence Campaign Planning.  This 
concept will ensure that battlefield commanders will have synergized intelligence at their 
disposal throughout the planning process.  According to Cambone, Intelligence 
Campaign Planning will “bring together DoD and Intelligence Community capabilities in 
a more synergistic effort [and] focus on ‘operationalizing intelligence,’ transforming the 
functions and capabilities of Defense intelligence into more than simply a supporting arm 
of the Department, but rather into a true joint operational capability.”55  This initiative 
will go a long way in ensuring that the combatant commander or Joint Task Force 
 
53 Beverly P. Mowery, “Horizontal Integration Aligns Strategies, Operating Concepts to Defeat New 
Threats,” Signal Connections 1, issue 6, 15 March 2004.   Article available at 
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commander will have all the available tailored intelligence to assist the decision-making 
process. 
4. All-Source Intelligence Centers  
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act also created a National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), responsible for integrating intelligence on terrorism 
and counterterrorism, and performing all-source analysis for planning purposes.  The 
Director of the NCTC is tasked by the DNI with providing “strategic operational plans 
for the civilian and military counterterrorism efforts of the United States Government and 
for the effective integration of counterterrorism intelligence and operations across agency 
boundaries, both inside and outside the United States.”56  The NCTC will take over the 
mission previously done by the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, and this new 
organization will enable different intelligence agencies to work together by putting all the 
intelligence data in one place.  It will provide the military and political leadership with a 
comprehensive assessment of terrorism threats around the world.  This will make it easier 
to integrate critical terrorism intelligence, and quickly push that time-sensitive 
information into the military planning process.  National-level intelligence has been a 
critical part of DoD’s planning and operational capabilities since the first Gulf War, and 
has become thoroughly integrated into military operations.57   
In addition to the NCTC, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
also creates a National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC), responsible for developing 
all-source intelligence support for counterproliferation efforts and “coordinating 
counterproliferation plans and activities of the various departments and agencies of the 
United States Government to prevent and halt the proliferation of WMD, their delivery 
systems, and related materials and technologies.”58  The Act also allows the DNI to 
create national intelligence centers in order to consolidate all-source intelligence.  
 
56 U.S. Congress, House Report 108-796 - Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 
December 2004, 38.  Available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/intel_reform.html (accessed 
July 2005).  Hereafter referred to as Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. 
57 Richard A. Best Jr., “Intelligence Community Reorganization: Potential Effects on DOD 
Intelligence Agencies,” Congressional Research Service: The Library of Congress, 6 December 2004, 4. 
58 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 40. 
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Consolidating intelligence analysis from different disciplines in one central location is a 
concept that is being developed for the first time.  Many would argue that the Intelligence 
Community would have uncovered clues about the 9/11 attacks much earlier had an all-
source collaborative intelligence organization had existed.  This is an innovation which is 
critical to fully understanding challenging threats that exist in today’s international 
climate.  There are too many layers of bureaucracy and “stovepipes” occurring in the 
Intelligence Community, and not enough crosstalk or coordination between the various 
intelligence agencies exists, which often prevents the entire intelligence picture from 
getting to the right customer at the right time.  New metrics will have to be created to 
effectively judge whether or not the new NCTC, NCPC, and National Intelligence 
Centers will be successful, but it is a step in the right direction. 
Quality intelligence analysis is critical to the success of all of these new 
intelligence centers.  Reforming analysis is another one of the new DNI’s top priorities.  
Once the information is collected, it must be analyzed thoroughly in order to give 
policymakers and military commanders the best possible intelligence to make sound 
decisions that will protect lives and assets.  Due to faulty analysis in the Iraq WMD, the 
United States suffered a serious loss of credibility in the eyes of the international 
community.  To correct this problem, the DNI’s office has created a new Strategic 
Analysis Unit to develop long-term research.  In addition, according to General Michael 
V. Hayden, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, the DNI is establishing 
centers of excellence that will facilitate alternative analysis, develop new procedures to 
review and evaluate the analytic tradecraft and reliability of finished intelligence 
products, and rebuild the expertise of intelligence analysis to ensure the integrity and 
credibility of intelligence products.59  In order to succeed in these goals, different 
agencies will have to share information and collaborate much more than ever before.  It 
will be the DNI’s responsibility to oversee reform efforts at the various agencies, and 
ensure that they all move towards increased collaboration.  The next section will discuss 
 
59 General Michael V. Hayden, Testimony Before House Permanent Select Committee Subcommittee 
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some of the specific reforms that are happening at the three of the intelligence agencies, 
CIA, NGA, and NSA. 
C. INTELLIGENCE REFORM AT CIA, NGA, AND NSA 
1. CIA/HUMINT Reform  
The CIA is undergoing a significant transformation in light of recent events that 
have placed the agency in full view of Congress and the American public.  These events 
have many questioning its ability to protect the United States and its citizens.  The agency 
took the brunt of the stinging criticism for the Iraq WMD fiasco and is still reeling from 
it.  Newly designated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act as 
National HUMINT manager, the CIA has seen a number of changes designed to increase 
the amount of human intelligence assets on the ground to infiltrate various adversary 
organizations.  The Intelligence Community is undoubtedly addressing HUMINT as a 
significant concern.  Army General (ret) Tommy Franks, former Commander of United 
States Central Command is one of the many voicing concern over the lack of human 
intelligence to provide accurate information.  He is adamant that the United States 
“invested too much in electronic spy surveillance and not enough in spies…to get 
information, we have to marry the devil or at least employ him. You have to deal.”60   
Much will be done to transform this area of intelligence.  Both the 9/11 Commission and 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act noted the importance of HUMINT 
to America’s safety.  The Act stated that the “continued development and improvement 
of a robust and empowered and flexible HUMINT work force is critical to identifying, 
understanding, and countering the plans and intentions of the adversaries of the United 
States.”61  However, it goes much deeper than just “spies” as General Franks’ comments 
suggest.  There is much more to be done than just putting agents in a country and expect 
quality intelligence to appear.   
 
60 “Retired General Pushes for More U.S. Spies,” CNN Online News Service, 29 July 2004, 
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Efforts are underway to begin more aggressive tactics to infiltrate terrorist 
organizations and hostile countries.  Human intelligence transformation will also include 
clandestine logistics, overt debriefers, interrogators, and a streamlined process to better 
manage and oversee human intelligence resources.62  In order to engage in more 
aggressive HUMINT tactics, there is a need for an increase in HUMINT-trained 
personnel.  In response to that need, President Bush recently ordered the Central 
Intelligence Agency to increase the number of spies by fifty percent and to double the 
number of agents in the research and development department tracking weapons of mass 
destruction.63  There has also been increased collaboration between the CIA and other 
organizations such as the Federal Bureau of Investigations and DoD to share intelligence 
and consolidate HUMINT efforts. As stated by General Hayden, “enabling our human 
intelligence collectors to obtain more information on the plans and intentions of our 
adversaries is among our top priorities.”64 
Additionally, the CIA is delving deeper into another intelligence discipline that 
has garnered little publicity.  Little emphasis has been placed on the art of open source 
intelligence, or OSINT, which entails gaining information from openly accessible sources 
such as the Internet or foreign media broadcasts.  According to Stephen Mercado, CIA 
analyst in the Directorate of Science and Technology, the vast amount of open source 
information available today will help change the way the Intelligence Community does 
business.  He states “The explosion in OSINT is transforming the intelligence world with 
the emergence of open versions of the covert arts of HUMINT, IMINT, and 
SIGINT...open sources increasingly enhance secret collection programs. The CIA, NGA, 
NSA, and other actors on the classified side all benefit from the growing volume of open 
data serving them as collateral information.”65  The 9/11 Commission, the Intelligence 
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Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, and the Commission on the Intelligence 
Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction all concurred 
that there needs to be some type of entity that deals with open source information.  The 
Intelligence Community is taking seriously the boom in information from open sources 
and making changes accordingly.  As part of an overall reform effort within the CIA, the 
agency is placing a higher priority on OSINT.  CIA Director Porter Goss has been tasked 
by the DNI with creating an open source organization within CIA with a 100 million 
dollar budget that will expand upon the work of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence 
Service, which translates foreign-language broadcasts.66 
2. NGA Reform Initiatives  
Responsible for coordinating the collection and processing of IMINT, the NGA 
(formerly the National Imagery and Mapping Agency) is also undergoing a significant 
transformation process and reform effort in order to meet the new intelligence challenges 
in the information age.  This is because NGA also received significant criticism from the 
WMD Commission on its failure to correctly assess the true nature of Iraq’s chemical 
warfare equipment.  The WMD Commission stated, “NGA has noted that imagery, when 
used alone, may not definitely determine the intended purpose of an adversary’s activity.  
The Community’s over-reliance on ambiguous imagery indicators thus played a pivotal 
role in its ultimate misjudgment that Iraq had restarted chemical weapons (CW) 
production and had increased its CW stockpiles.”67   Therefore, NGA is working on a 
number of initiatives that are helping them provide timely geospatial intelligence needed 
to understand the enemy and avoid the failures of the past.  One such initiative is a 
collaborative tool called Future Intelligence Requirements Environment (FIRE).  All of 
the various commissions have criticized the Intelligence Community on its failure to 
collaborate and share information; the FIRE system may be the answer to that problem.  
Originally designed to look at longer-term intelligence problems, analysts at NGA 
believe that there may be an opportunity to use FIRE for more current applications.  FIRE 
is a database that pulls information from different intelligence agencies, and it also has 
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analytical tools available for analysts to run simulations and models.  It has the ability to 
lay out possibilities and options based on accumulated data collected from sensors, and 
from known data about friendly and enemy platforms and systems entered by subject-
matter experts across many different fields.68   
NGA’s mission has become much more difficult with the increase in adversary 
use of denial and deception and urban terrain, as well as the need to conduct rapid bomb 
damage assessments for time-sensitive targeting strikes.  NGA has been very involved in 
the persistent surveillance and horizontal integration initiatives, and has developed a 
geospatial knowledge base (GKB) to support those reforms and negate the enemy’s 
tactics.  The GKB will contain information and let analysts monitor various intelligence 
problems, and the GKB can search for links, patterns, and anomalies within the collected 
information, and also cue analysts automatically and conduct tasking.69  These types of 
programs will go a long way towards increasing the amount of collaboration, integration, 
and information sharing between the different intelligence agencies. 
3. NSA Transformation 
Throughout its 52 year history, NSA has had two primary missions – SIGINT and 
information assurance (IA) – the nation’s codemakers and codebreakers.   As America’s 
cryptologic organization, NSA “coordinates, directs, and performs highly specialized 
activities to protect friendly information systems and produce foreign intelligence 
information.”70  Recently, NSA has received broad criticism over the last few years for 
internal agency problems that may be partially responsible for some of the intelligence 
“failures” that have occurred.  These include the inability to detect the Indian nuclear test 
in 1998, the embassy bombings in Africa in 1988, and difficulties in tracking terrorists 
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such as Osama bin Laden.71  As a result of this criticism, the SIGINT discipline has been 
undergoing a transformation over the last few years, putting reform at the forefront of its 
operations in order to meet the new dynamic challenges of the 21st century.  A more 
extensive examination of the agency shows that it is a great example of transformation to 
make itself a more viable intelligence organization to go after difficult problem sets.  The 
Intelligence Community’s current blueprint for reform almost mirrors what NSA has 
done over the last few years.  This section of the chapter will explain why NSA made the 
changes it did, and outline some of the innovations that NSA undertook to transform 
itself to meet the challenges of today’s increasingly astute adversaries who are becoming 
more adept at using information warfare and asymmetrical warfare to their advantage.   
During the Cold War, NSA had a relatively unlimited budget to monitor the 
Soviet Union threat, but the demise of the Soviet Union left the agency without a true 
enemy.  As a result, personnel and budget levels decreased at NSA as well as at other 
defense agencies.72  Congressional committees responsible for oversight over the agency 
were also extremely critical of NSA’s operations.  Congress reported that the agency ran 
the risk of beginning the new century without the technological infrastructure and human 
resources needed solely to maintain the status quo, or even meet emerging challenges.73  
NSA helped to win the Cold War, and thus saw no need to change or to innovate to stay 
ahead of the curve, which left the agency extremely vulnerable to failure and criticism. 
Air Force General Michael V. Hayden served as the Director of the National 
Security Agency from March 1999 until April 2005, the longest serving Director in the 
50 year history of the agency.  He is the Department of Defense’s senior uniformed 
intelligence officer and was recently appointed by President Bush to become the first 
Deputy Director for National Intelligence, receiving a fourth star in the process.  General 
Hayden was tasked by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the Director of Central 
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Intelligence (DCI) to fix the agency’s problems and bring the agency back to prominence.  
Without change, the agency would have been reduced to irrelevancy in the high-tech 
information age.  One of the first things General Hayden received from DCI George 
Tenet, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and the Congressional oversight committees was 
“top-cover.”  They allowed General Hayden the freedom to institute sweeping changes at 
the agency, fully knowing that there were some things that NSA would be unable to do in 
the short term because the agency would have to focus on transformation in order to build 
up the agency again.  The “top-cover” and support from the DCI, SECDEF, and Congress 
allowed General Hayden the flexibility to take some risks at the agency and use some 
unconventional methods to make substantial and lasting changes.   
Upon assumption of command, General Hayden commissioned two reviews 
teams to give him an unvarnished update on the state of the agency.  One internal team 
was made up of NSA employees, and a second group was composed of independent 
outside experts, named the External Review Team.  The External Team was the first of 
many attempts by General Hayden to go outside of the agency to get a critical unbiased 
look at his organization.  The External Review Team produced a detailed scathing report 
on the agency with numerous recommendations for General Hayden to address 
immediately; NSA was an agency in crisis.  The main thrust of the report was that NSA 
was buried deep in bureaucratic conflict, addled with poor leadership and that the agency 
had lost touch with its customers and stakeholders.74  NSA had become too wedded to its 
standard operating procedures that had developed over time during the Cold War.  
Despite the successes of the agency in the past, extensive organizational problems existed 
that would need to be addressed in order to truly transform the agency.   
Some of the specific issues outlined in the report stated that NSA suffered from 
poor financial management, a fractured personnel system, an insular culture, and a 
broken decision making process demonstrated by a lack of accountability and 
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empowerment.75  The bureaucratic impediments to change and innovation that were 
present at NSA were threatening to lead the agency towards obsolescence.  The insular 
culture of the agency was deeply imbedded in the organization and had emerged over the 
agency’s fifty year history because of its need for secrecy.  An insular organization such 
as NSA suffered from groupthink, failing to offer criticism of other members in the 
organization and failing to share information with other similar organizations, which 
stifles innovation and creativity.76  This is characteristic of the problems that afflict the 
entire Intelligence Community.  Additionally, NSA ran the risk of falling behind the 
commercial world in technology, which was allowing adversaries to catch up and 
increase its capabilities. 
After reviewing the external and internal reports, General Hayden started the era 
of transformation at NSA by initiating the “100 Days of Change.”  This was the 
beginning of his effort to reshape the culture throughout the agency.  Hayden, in effect, 
was attempting to change NSA’s measure of effectiveness (MOE) from status quo 
operations (NSA continuing as solely a “gatherer” of information) to NSA being 
successful in the GWOT and becoming more of an aggressive “hunter” for critical 
intelligence information.  This would prove to be an extremely difficult task, since the 
agency was, by its nature, an insular, secretive agency that was resistant to change.  
General Hayden’s challenge was to transform not only the mission of the agency but to 
change its ethos as well, a challenge that faces the entire Intelligence Community.  Since 
the cultural dynamic was one of secrecy, General Hayden attempted to overcome that by 
putting a human face on the agency and showing the public that the mission was still 
being accomplished without their civil liberties being violated.  To make things even 
more difficult, transformation had to occur in the midst of fighting not just one adversary 
as in the Cold War, but multiple enemies in the new security environment. 
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The four main transformation goals established by NSA in 1999 under General 
Hayden’s leadership are as follows: 
1)  Ensure responsive intelligence information and information assurance for 
national decisionmakers and military commanders.  
2)  Continuously modernize the cryptologic system by using advanced technology 
to provide solutions for the production and protection of information. 
3)  Shape the NSA workforce to meet SIGINT and Information Assurance 
mission challenges.  
4)  Maximize the use of resources through effective business processes and 
prudent risk to achieve and sustain responsive Signals Intelligence and 
Information Assurance solutions.77  
Regarding the first transformation goal, NSA revamped many procedures to make 
sure that those who need critical intelligence are able to get that information in a timely 
manner.  One of the first things General Hayden did to achieve this goal was to 
restructure his leadership team.  This allowed his directorates to run the day-to-day 
operations and reduce bureaucratic impediments that were preventing the agency from 
running at maximum efficiency.78  The new streamlined management structure ensures 
that the agency can quickly respond instead of going through layers of supervision and 
bureaucracy to get information to the right place at the right time.  In order to create a 
new leadership team, NSA went from five large directorates to two primary directorates, 
one for SIGINT and one for IA.  Several senior leaders from outside of the agency were 
brought in to give fresh perspectives and assist in bringing about real change, innovation, 
and cooperation at the agency.  These new leaders ignored the long standing “we’ve 
always done it this way at NSA” culture, and gave General Hayden new ideas on how to 
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help implement his vision.  He encouraged over 100 Senior Executive Service (SES) 
members to take early or normal retirement, hired twenty-eight SES personnel from 
outside NSA,79 and promoted many junior executives who had innovative ideas but were 
being marginalized by the old guard leaders.  By bringing in new blood, NSA was able to 
spark creativity by hiring new leaders who rejected and ignored the organizational 
code.80     
Due to the inherent technical nature of the SIGINT discipline, NSA depends 
heavily on technology to do its mission.  NSA’s second transformation goal focuses on 
NSA’s reliance on technology, and was arguably the most problematic and difficult to 
achieve.  The sheer volume of information now available to intelligence professionals for 
collection, analysis, and dissemination to military and policy decision-makers to keep the 
nation, its military forces, and its allies safe is the biggest challenge facing NSA.  The 
agency was falling behind technologically, especially since adversaries appear to have the 
ability to access the same telecommunications network that we do.  General Hayden said 
that “technologically we had to keep pace with an oligarchic, resource-poor, 
technologically inferior, over-bureaucratized, slow-moving nation-state...adversary 
communications are now based upon the developmental cycle of a global industry that is 
literally moving at the speed of light - cell phones, encryption, fiber optic 
communications, and digital communications.”81   To deal with this problem, NSA 
initiated Projects GROUNDBREAKER and TRAILBLAZER.  GROUNDBREAKER is 
a multi-billion dollar information technology outsourcing program that will increase 
NSA’s dependence on commercial, off-the-shelf hardware and software.82  
TRAILBLAZER is a DoD acquisition program that uses the U.S. commercial industry to 
obtain an architectured and integrated system to provide much-needed mission 
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capabilities in telecommunications.83  Both programs have been instrumental in 
addressing NSA’s technology issues, helping them to keep pace with a rapidly changing 
technological world.   Extremely controversial at their inception, GROUNDBREAKER 
and TRAILBLAZER were also created to be independent organizations within NSA 
answering only to General Hayden, and he gave them the freedom to explore new ways 
of doing business without interference from within the agency.    
NSA was severely criticized for not transforming much earlier in order to keep 
pace with today’s technology.  The agency that earned its living by tapping into copper 
cables and intercepting broadcast transmissions in the Cold War era was having difficulty 
dealing with fiber-optic cables and modern encryption.84  Then, NSA suffered a 
potentially devastating setback in January 2000, when its computers crashed due to a 
software anomaly.  The agency was unable to forward intelligence data, process that data 
and communicate internally for 72 hours.  Normal operations finally resumed but at the 
cost of thousands of man-hours and one and a half million dollars.85   This only 
highlighted the severity of the aging technology at the agency, which the transformation 
initiatives were working to remedy.  Technology-based organizations such as NSA have 
little choice but to challenge current existing paradigms because the rapidly changing 
environment in which they function makes it vital to shake up the status quo,86 because 
disastrous results could occur if they stand still.  Again, this is the same challenge that 
faces the entire Intelligence Community.  
The third goal, shaping the NSA workforce, has also been difficult for the agency 
because of the emphasis on DoD personnel downsizing since the end of the Cold War.  
As a result of the downsizing and the lack of new hires over the last decade, NSA found 
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itself with an aging workforce that had minimal experience with current technology.  
Now, NSA is hiring to infuse the agency with new blood.  More than twenty-two percent 
of the agency’s current civilian work force has been hired since 2000,87 and NSA hopes 
to continue the increase civilian billets between FY2005 and FY2008 to enhance the 
existing workforce with the multidisciplinary, analytic, and technical personnel needed to 
continue transforming the agency.88  Although NSA drastically altered the dynamic of its 
workforce by making it younger, it continued the overall mission of the agency unabated. 
In order to work towards the fourth transformation goal, developing effective 
business processes, NSA also went outside the agency for help as mentioned earlier, 
which was one of the recommendations of both the Internal and External Review Teams.  
General Hayden created the positions of Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and Senior 
Acquisition Executive (SAE), reporting directly to him.  He hired from the outside to 
bring in acquisition and industry expertise that was not resident to the agency.  Both of 
these people had extensive knowledge in their respective fields, but they also came to the 
agency with no preconceived notions of how things should be run at NSA.  Since they 
were unaware of the agency’s status quo mentality, they were not bound by preconceived 
notions of the agency, which is critical for developing creativity and innovation.89  This 
allowed them to implement major structural changes within the agency.  The CFO and 
SAE are now responsible for consolidating all the financial and acquisition elements that 
had previously been farmed out throughout the entire agency.   
The 9/11 terrorist attacks showed the world how adversaries are devising new 
asymmetrical methods and strategies to defeat our forces.  NSA took some criticism for 
not having information that could have prevented the 9/11 attacks.  Through its numerous 
transformation efforts, NSA has made an attempt to overcome cultural and institutional 
barriers in order to ensure vital information gets to the right people at the right time.  As 
General Hayden states, “the ultimate weapon against terrorists is information regarding 
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their identity and intent…but intelligence is useless if it doesn’t get to the people who 
need it.”90   The NSA transformation process was accelerated after the 9/11 attacks with 
three goals in mind: continue to bring in new personnel, keep turning to industry for 
business and technology solutions, and maintain a social contract with the American 
people to protect their privacy.91  
NSA is working hard to change the “stovepipes” mentality and increase the 
amount of crosstalk and communication between the different intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies.  General Hayden has strengthened relations with other spy 
agencies by placing more of his officers at the CIA and other locations to improve 
collaboration.92  The current phase of transformation at the agency initiated in 2003 is 
called “Transformation 2.0 – Cryptology as a Team Sport.”  The four pillars of this next 
transformation phase consist of “Mission Blending,” which is enhancing coordination 
between the Signals Intelligence Directorate and the Information Assurance Directorate; 
“Extending the Enterprise,” which is coordination across the entire Signals Intelligence 
enterprise; “Community,” or integration with intelligence and Information Assurance 
partners through the community; and “Cooperating,” or collaborating with the agency’s 
clients.93  These goals again look similar to the ones of the Intelligence Community today 
in the midst of reform.  NSA wants to ensure that warfighters at the operational and 
tactical levels, as well as the policymakers at the strategic levels, are able to get critical 
information necessary to make informed decisions.  This process worked extremely well 
in OIF.  Marines were able to access NSA computers down to the regiment level, the 
Army at the division echelon and the Air Force at theater command centers, 
complementing DoD’s network-centric warfare concept and significantly shortening 
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target identification to time of attack.94   Additionally, the Bush administration is 
considering making NSA the lead agency for sharing homeland security information 
across government computer networks, thus expanding NSA’s responsibility to help 
defend the complex network of data pipelines carrying warnings and other sensitive 
information.95   Newly appointed NSA Director Army Lieutenant General Keith 
Alexander is tasked with continuing down the path of reform and transformation started 
by General Hayden. 
NSA is challenging the existing way that intelligence has operated over the last 
decade.  The Intelligence Community as a whole has undergone a doctrinal shift, moving 
from a cultural framework of being regarded as a “support” entity to now being fully 
integrated into military operations.  Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OIF 
showed an unprecedented level of synergy between the intelligence and operations 
disciplines, especially in increasing the shooter-to-sensor capabilities that get critical 
near-real-time information to the cockpit to engage time-sensitive targets.  When 
successful, this disruptive innovation surpasses the traditional way that intelligence has 
been regarded and outperforms the traditional way intelligence has been utilized.  Truly 
integrating intelligence into operations had been underestimated as a concept due to 
cultural biases that separated the two disciplines.  Many senior leaders were not 
convinced of the capability that intelligence and operations integration could bring to the 
warfight.  According to General Hayden, who was one of the few proponents of 
intelligence/operations integration in its early stages, says that in today’s security 
environment, there is no distinction between intelligence and operations - intelligence is 
in itself an operation.  He stated that “integration is essential to conducting successful 
military operations, but it has to be done the right way - intelligence professionals should 
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consider themselves part of the fight, and must shed the cultural distinction of being 
thought of as “supporting” the warfighter.”96    
As the National Military Strategy states, “deterring threats and preventing surprise 
attacks will place increasing demands on intelligence assets, the agility and decisiveness 
of the force and the ability to work time-critical issues in the interagency 
setting...preventative missions require shared, “actionable” intelligence….”97  As the 
Intelligence Community attempts to transform, NSA has already undergone a significant 
transformation process in order to meet the dynamic new intelligence challenges in the 
information age.  SIGINT has consistently provided the nation’s decision-makers with 
additional knowledge and understanding of international developments and threats to the 
nation’s security.98  Under General Hayden’s leadership, NSA moved from a “reactive” 
agency focused on a single Cold War threat in the industrial age (with an MOE of status 
quo intelligence gathering indicative of the Cold War era) to a lean, “proactive” agency 
focused on multiple, regional threats in the information age (new MOE of success in 
prosecuting the GWOT by actively hunting for vital information of intelligence value).  
NSA has been a great example of an intelligence agency moving in the right direction to 
combat today’s adversaries in the threat environment of rogue states and terrorist 
elements.  Other agencies, and the Intelligence Community as a whole, are following its 
lead in the ways of transformation.  The Intelligence Community will benefit from 
General Hayden’s move to the DNI’s second in command, because of his success at 
reform efforts at NSA.  Gaining an advantage over our adversaries is of the utmost 
importance in today’s dangerous world.  NSA’s transformation initiatives and 
innovations will continue to put them at the forefront of America’s Intelligence 
Community and ensure that they will be poised to be successful in the 21st century.  
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Enhancements in technical intelligence collection will be a large part of the 
intelligence reform process, which will most affect NSA and NGA.  It can be argued that 
collection is the most critical part of the intelligence process.  If there is little or no 
intelligence collected on an adversary, intelligence analysis will lack substance and be 
incomplete.  The DNI is working on an effort to modernize and upgrade the country’s 
overhead architecture, another priority of the newly established office.  According to 
General Hayden, the DNI will work with intelligence program managers and DoD to 
improve the requirements, system, and architectural development process for all technical 
collection systems, and their integration.99 
D.  TACTICAL/OPERATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE REFORM 
All of the initiatives outlined above make it clear that the Intelligence Community 
is transforming at the strategic, national-level agencies.  However, it has been undergoing 
transforming at the operational and tactical levels as well.  A primary example of this 
transformation has been demonstrated by United States Air Force Intelligence over the 
last few years with excellent results being produced in OEF and OIF.  Air Force 
Intelligence has been in the process of moving from a cultural framework of being 
regarded as a “support” entity to being fully integrated into military operations.  As the 
Intelligence Community changes to meet the new security challenges of the 21st century, 
it is important for the intelligence and operations disciplines to be fully integrated in 
order to be successful in this post-Cold War environment.  The terrorist attacks of 9/11 
showed the country how adversaries are devising new asymmetrical methods and 
strategies to defeat our forces, and that military options may be needed to defeat these 
adversaries, so intelligence reform must occur at this level as well. 
The Air Force’s Air Intelligence Agency (AIA) merged with the Air Combat 
Command’s (ACC) 8th Air Force on 1 February 2001, signifying a first step toward fully 
integrating intelligence operations into warfighting commands at the operational level.  
This merger was hailed as one of the most important warfighting milestones the history 
of the Air Force, and may serve as an example for other services.  According to then-
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ACC Commander and recently retired Air Force Chief of Staff General John Jumper, 
“this is a natural evolution…it’s an idea whose time has come. This integrates our 
information warfare skills and talents into the normal tactical and operational level of war 
just as we do fighters, bombers and others.”100 This integration represents the 
acknowledgment by the operations community of the value of intelligence, which in 
today’s world is critical to having successful military operations.  OEF and OIF showed 
an unprecedented level of synergy between the intelligence and operations disciplines, 
especially in increasing the shooter-to-sensor capabilities that get critical near-real-time 
information to the cockpit to engage time-sensitive targets.  In Afghanistan, United States 
combat performance was significantly improved due to an added reliance on precision-
guided weapons which were made successful by enhanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.101  The Iraq War produced similar positive results by 
integrating intelligence throughout operational planning and execution:  ISR and 
targeting capabilities, intelligence dissemination and timeliness, as well as overall 
situational awareness were all greatly improved.102  These successes show that if 
intelligence is integrated fully into military operations, there is a significant increase in 
operational capability and operational success in this new post-Cold War information era, 
and the AIA-ACC merger was a first step to achieve that end state. 
E.  CONCLUSION 
The Intelligence Community will continue to play a significant role as the nature 
of war continues to evolve in the post-Cold War era into asymmetric warfare, information 
warfare, and terrorism.  With the increase in available information, and with the increase 
in technology, the need continues to grow for policymakers, warfighters, and operational 
commanders to get timely, tailored, and accurate intelligence information in order to 
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protect American lives and interests.  The 9/11 Commission Report, the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, and WMD Commission have highlighted this 
urgency by ultimately creating legislation to ensure that our intelligence agencies are 
working together in the most efficient way possible to prevent another tragedy.   
The initiatives outlined in this chapter are by no means an all-encompassing list of 
the transformation proposals occurring throughout the Intelligence Community today.  
There are many other initiatives ongoing to ensure that the Intelligence Community is 
doing everything it can to understand the capabilities and intentions of the enemy, and to 
ensure that information is integrated into operational plans continuously throughout the 
planning process.  The transformation initiatives outlined here (creation of the DNI 
position, horizontal integration, persistent surveillance, and Intelligence Campaign 
Planning initiatives, newly created all-source intelligence centers, and HUMINT, OSINT, 
SIGINT, and IMINT reforms) are a starting point to reduce or eliminate the “stovepipes” 
that exist, enabling the Intelligence Community to regain confidence and credibility, and 
to ensure that intelligence is seamlessly integrated into operations at the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels of war.  Previous attempts to reform the Intelligence 
Community have had less than stellar results.  However, if these reforms are moderately 
successful, this will give the United States a better ability to truly know and understand 
the capabilities and intentions of all of its adversaries, to prevent future attacks against 
America’s interests, and to avoid another intelligence failure like the one seen with Iraq’s 
WMD program.  Chapter IV further analyzes these intelligence reforms and applies them 
to determine how they might better provide insight into North Korea’s WMD capabilities 











                                                
IV. A REVAMPED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO 
UNDERSTAND NORTH KOREA’S WMD PROGRAM 
While the administration was busy preparing, and then launching, a war to 
rid Iraq's suspected (and now it seems non-existent) WMD, North Korea 
may have acquired four times the fissionable materials it had before, or six 
more nuclear devices.103 
Jack Pritchard 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As was outlined in the previous chapter, numerous reform efforts are now 
occurring within the Intelligence Community to make it a more viable and efficient 
organization.  The issue at hand is that because of the tenuous situation on the Korean 
peninsula, the United States cannot afford a repeat of the failure to uncover Iraq’s WMD 
program.  Despite the intelligence gaps that exist on Pyongyang’s WMD operations, 
North Korea’s situation is much more dangerous than Iraq based on what is currently 
known about the program.  An example of the problem that faces the Intelligence 
Community when working the North Korea problem set was recently seen when the 
Intelligence Community tried to determine if North Korea was planning a nuclear test in 
the Spring of 2005.  There were differing viewpoints on whether tunneling activity at a 
North Korean military facility was in fact preparation for a nuclear test.  CIA officials 
espoused a more conservative assessment, stating that North Korea was unlikely to 
conduct a nuclear test for fear of antagonizing China, its only real ally in the region.  
Conversely, the White House, the Pentagon, and the offices within the Energy 
Department all offered a more ominous version of the activity, calling it 
“unprecedented.”  The two different assessments were based on satellite-derived 
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intelligence, which left the analysis open to conflicting interpretations and agendas.104  
The divergent intelligence assessments show the difficulty in coordinating these 
assessments of difficult problem sets such as North Korea.   
The difficulty and importance of gaining sound intelligence on a country’s 
unconventional weapons program was made evident in the 1960’s when it was 
discovered that China was working on a nuclear program.  The Intelligence Community 
provided critical information on the Chinese nuclear program, which enabled 
policymakers to make firm decisions that preserved national security and their efforts to 
estimate China’s nuclear progress, and the effect it would have on the world stage is a 
historical milestone for the Intelligence Community.105  Additionally, one could make a 
case that if the United States had better intelligence capabilities back in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, the political and military leadership might not have been surprised by 
the Russians achieving nuclear parity and eventually surpassing the United States.  Better 
intelligence could have given the leadership critical information on the Russian nuclear 
program which may have caused the United States not to accept nuclear parity and 
change their deterrence posture. 
These and other intelligence failures highlight the need for improved intelligence 
to better understand the threat posed by North Korea WMD.  For example, in addition to 
the Iraq WMD failure, two other critical intelligence failures dealing with WMD are: the 
inability to detect the Indian nuclear test in early May 1998, and a National Intelligence 
Estimate that incorrectly stated North Korea was at least 10 years away from fielding an 
intercontinental ballistic missile.106  The importance of intelligence in determining 
nuclear capability is evident in both of these failures.  The Indian nuclear test that was not 
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detected or anticipated by the Intelligence Community was countered with Pakistan 
conducting a nuclear test of its own a few weeks later on 28 and 30 May.  Continued 
nuclear proliferation between those two countries will undoubtedly destabilize the entire 
region.  Additionally, the failure to provide an accurate assessment of North Korea’s 
intercontinental ballistic missile capability means that the United States underestimated 
the fact that North Korea could put a nuclear weapon on a long range missile and could 
threaten regional neighbors.  Intelligence Community assessments state that the multiple-
stage Taepo Dong-2 long range missile may be capable of reaching parts of the United 
States with a nuclear weapon-sized payload, but there is no consensus on whether or not 
North Korea has perfected that capability as of yet.  The importance of gaining better 
intelligence to uncover aspects of the North Korean unconventional weapons program is 
clearly evident.  Any changes that the Intelligence Community makes will have a direct 
effect on discovering the weapons proliferation plans of rogue nations, specifically North 
Korea. 
The Intelligence Community does have a success story when it comes to 
understanding the WMD capabilities of a known adversary.  In the case of Libya, the 
Intelligence Community was extremely successful in crafting an accurate assessment of 
Colonel Qaddafi’s unconventional weapons program.  It can be argued that the 
Intelligence Community had a considerable effect on Libya dismantling its WMD 
program.  The Intelligence Community had focused on Libya’s efforts in state-sponsored 
terrorism for decades.  As Libya turned its attention away from terrorism and moved 
towards WMD proliferation in the 1990s, the Intelligence Community’s tenacity in 
detailing the Libyan problem set allowed it to keep policymakers and military 
commanders informed of Libya’s WMD operations and facilities. The WMD 
Commission report explained that the Intelligence Community, although not perfect, had 
generally accurate assessments of the Libyan unconventional weapons programs. The 
report stated that the Intelligence Community “had intelligence on facility locations, 
personnel involved in the programs, and Libya’s cooperative efforts with other 
nations.”107  The intelligence efforts were able to give civilian and military 
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decisionmakers enough information to allow them to make informed decisions to deal 
with Libyan threat.  By having accurate intelligence, it also allowed the bring allies 
aboard in condemning Libya, and also allowed the United States to be aggressive in 
coercing Libya to do away with its program.  According to CIA Director Porter Goss, 
Libya serves as “a good news story, one that reflects the patient perseverance with which 
the Intelligence Community can tackle a tough intelligence problem.”108  
So how can the Intelligence Community learn from the cases of Iraq and Libya to 
understand North Korea’s unconventional weapons program?  Today’s intelligence 
reform efforts such as the establishment of the DNI, creation of national intelligence 
centers and the National Counterproliferation Center, HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT and 
OSINT initiatives, horizontal integration, and persistent surveillance all are useful first 
steps in the right direction. In this chapter, I further analyze these intelligence reforms 
and put them into categories of collection, analysis, and collaboration.  I then show how 
these changes within the Intelligence Community could lead to better insight on the 
North Korea WMD program and North Korea as a whole. 
B. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION 
Intelligence collection is probably the most important part of the intelligence 
cycle.  Intelligence collection can be more specifically defined as “matching validated 
intelligence objectives to available sources of information, with the results to be 
transformed into usable intelligence.”109  In today’s information age, there is so much 
information to be collected that sifting through the vast amount of data can often become 
problematic.  General Hayden summed up the information problem when he explained, 
“Forty years ago, there were 5,000 stand-alone computers, no fax machines and not one 
cellular phone.  Today, there are over 180 million computers—most of them networked.  
There are roughly 14 million fax machines and 40 million cell phones, and those numbers 
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continue to grow.”110  The information collected must then be turned into useful 
intelligence on a particular problem set.  As stated earlier, the problem with North Korea 
is the insular nature of the country, which presents a challenge to the intelligence 
apparatus tasked with collection on the country.  Severe criticism was levied upon the 
Intelligence Community in the WMD Commission report regarding intelligence 
collection on North Korea, saying that the community had only a “limited ability to 
engage in long-term, coordinated planning on existing threats, let alone to anticipate 
surprises.”111  This section examines the various intelligence collection disciplines and 
analyzes how the reforms within those disciplines will help better understand the North 
Korean threat WMD threat.  
1. HUMINT 
Reform efforts are calling for an overall increase in the amount of human 
intelligence agents engaged in spy operations around the world as well as more 
aggressive field operations.  There must be an increased focus on HUMINT to deal with 
the North Korean WMD threat.  Donald Gregg, who spent time as a CIA officer and 
Ambassador in Korea, stated that the HUMINT situation in North Korea left much to be 
desired.  Gregg professed, “My efforts as the senior CIA officer in Korea to produce 
significant intelligence on North Korea were totally unsuccessful...North Korea remains 
one of the longest-running intelligence failures in the history of U.S. espionage.  North 
Koreans were difficult to approach and almost impossible to recruit and control….”112  
Penetrating an insular country like North Korea will undoubtedly take time and will be an 
extremely difficult challenge, but it is a vital part on any intelligence collection plan.  
There is no better intelligence than first-hand accounts of what is occurring in the 
operating area.  However, there are a limited number of spies operating in North Korea, 
and the Intelligence Community has to negate the North Korea’s skilled 
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counterintelligence techniques and effective use of denial and deception.113  Senator 
Saxby Chambliss (R-Georgia), a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
is one of many who agree with the theory of HUMINT being the most important of the 
intelligence disciplines.  In discussing the importance of focusing on increasing 
America’s HUMINT capabilities, Senator Chambliss stated, 
HUMINT is a dirty business, a dangerous profession, and we must be 
prepared to accept the risks associated with spying on those who seek to 
harm us, whether they be a small terrorist cell, a larger international 
terrorist organization, or a rogue nation-state. North Korea, for example, is 
developing the means to deliver nuclear weapons to close and important 
allies, like Japan, or to our own state of Hawaii and our Pacific Coast—we 
cannot afford to let down our guard or relax our intelligence awareness.114 
The United States and the Intelligence Community must not become too wedded to 
HUMINT-derived information.  HUMINT is not a panacea; it has a number of significant 
limitations.  It is susceptible to deception, and it can be time consuming to gain just a 
small amount of valuable intelligence.  To be effective, HUMINT must be fused with 
other intelligence disciplines in an all-source methodology.  Intelligence derived from 
human sources can be used to cue other intelligence systems to uncover more 
information.  However, the proposed increase in the level of effort within HUMINT will 
aid in gaining better intelligence on the North Korean unconventional weapons program. 
2. OSINT 
The Intelligence Community must also increase the level of effort and place a 
new emphasis on open source intelligence, and it appears that this will be a priority for 
the DNI.  Previously, open source information has not been placed in high regard.  
Intelligence analysts tend to focus on the “classified” part of intelligence, believing that 
unclassified information has little value in understanding a difficult problem set like 
North Korea, but intelligence collected via covert means has more value.  This is a 
common misconception.  However, like HUMINT, open source information can enhance 
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the other intelligence disciplines, and cue sensors to focus on information that may be of 
intelligence value.  Critics of OSINT-derived information say that little intelligence can 
come out of an isolated country such as North Korea.  But despite North Korea’s insular 
nature, proponents of OSINT explain that open source information can provide much 
more intelligence than was previously assumed.   
Readily available information on North Korea comes from its limited media 
outlets.  With only two main newspapers that spout the party propaganda, one media 
outlet in the Korea Central News Agency, no opposition press, and minimal internet 
access throughout the country, there is only a finite amount of information that comes out 
of these outlets.  Former Australian diplomat Dr. Adrian Buzo, who briefly lived in 
Pyongyang, warns analysts to not so easily dismiss OSINT-derived information on North 
Korea.  He states explains that the North Korean media is a "continuing record of the 
regime's priorities, of its ideological concerns, and of key personnel changes…sustained 
exposure to the DPRK media is an essential requirement for the would-be analyst….”115  
Because of the dearth of HUMINT from North Korea, open source information that 
originates from North Korea can provide intelligence analysts with a plethora of insight 
into North Korea’s operations and culture.  That insight may lead to clues on North 
Korea’s clandestine operations, which will in turn prompt other collection assets to focus 
on new areas of interest.  The increased focus on OSINT within the Intelligence 
Community, and specifically within CIA will seek to exploit this valuable but little used 
source. 
3. SIGINT and IMINT 
Signals intelligence faces similar challenges to HUMINT collectors on the North 
Korea problem set.  It is difficult to collect communications on a target that restricts 
communication of its people.  However, the changes that have been made at NSA have 
set the agency on the path to uncover the dangers posed by our adversaries.  NSA went 
from passively collecting intelligence to aggressively hunting for intelligence.  This 
concept is critical to gaining a decisive edge in understanding the North Korea 
unconventional weapons threat.  Because of North Korea’s use of denial and deception, 
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as well as its keen use of emissions control, SIGINT analysts will have to become much 
more aggressive when searching out North Korean communications.  A more aggressive 
SIGINT plan, buoyed by NSA’s improved information technology network and 
telecommunications architecture via GROUNDBREAKER and TRAILBLAZER, will 
allow the agency to collect more information on North Korea’s WMD program, and on 
North Korea as a whole.  Persistent surveillance initiatives will address the threat by 
giving the Intelligence Community the ability to have a constant SIGINT collection effort 
against the North Korean target.  In the event that the United States find itself in a 
confrontation with North Korea, the integration efforts ongoing at NSA are enabling 
military units at the tactical levels to access NSA databases to lessen the timeline from 
target identification to time of attack.116  This should prove invaluable in the event of an 
attack against North Korea WMD or conventional military assets.   
There remains a critical need for geospatial intelligence to locate WMD facilities 
and to uncover hard and deeply buried targets (HDBT) targets in a conflict with North 
Korea.  This is arguably the most difficult challenge the Intelligence Community faces 
when trying to uncover data on the North Korea WMD program.  North Korea’s nuclear 
program alone poses a significant challenge in locating and ultimately targeting its 
nuclear assets.  Even though the Intelligence Community has a decent amount of 
information about North Korea’s the nuclear reactors, fuel fabrication facilities, and 
reprocessing facilities that constitute the critical parts of the program, Pyongyang could 
still have clandestine reprocessing facilities that might be located in underground hidden 
locations.117  Locating any type of uranium enrichment facility will also present 
challenges.  There is still an intelligence gap regarding North Korean uranium enrichment 
facilities, although a few sites have been identified as suspected sites.  With the large 
amount of underground and hidden facilities buried in North Korea, geospatial 
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intelligence will play a large role in identifying HDBT targets.  The North Korean’s use 
of denial and deception tactics will make targeting even more problematic.  
Persistent surveillance and horizontal integration and should play a large role in 
IMINT’s efforts to target and track North Korea’s WMD assets.  Persistent surveillance 
efforts will affect NGA’s role in North Korea WMD.  In order to discover suspected 
NBC facilities, detect HDBTs, or defeat North Korean denial and deception efforts, NGA 
must have a continuous collection capability throughout air, space, and ground.  This 
capability could prove to be useful during a military confrontation with North Korea, as 
the need for time-sensitive battle damage assessments increases.  Horizontal integration is 
designed to merge analysis of an enemy’s capabilities and intentions in a user-friendly 
environment.   NGA’s geospatial knowledge base (GKB) will aid in integrating 
intelligence assets in order to ensure all known elements of the North Korea 
unconventional weapons program are a part of the GKB and shared through the 
Intelligence Community.  NGA’s Future Intelligence Requirements Environment 
integration initiative will pull information from different intelligence agencies and use 
analytical tools for simulations and models that can be used to understand the North 
Korean problem set.  Further intelligence integration and collaboration efforts will be 
discussed later in this chapter.   
IMINT and SIGINT analysts may find themselves faced with an additional 
challenge as a result of a recently passed bill in the House of Representatives.  The 2006 
Intelligence Authorization Bill eliminates or decreases funding for a small amount of 
extremely expensive satellite programs.  Congressional overseers of the satellite 
programs believe that the programs are suffering from mismanagement and poor 
performance, so the bill calls for the curtailment of these programs.  In the long term, this 
may have detrimental effects on how the Intelligence Community prosecutes the North 
Korean WMD targets.   
4. Legal Issues 
Regarding intelligence collection operations, the Intelligence Community must be 
given the freedom to get close to the line of legality when performing intelligence 
operations.  There are numerous rules and regulations that govern collection operations to 
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ensure that the fourth amendment rights of American citizens are being protected.  
However, if the Intelligence Community is serious about dealing with the North Korea 
WMD program, it will have to make some adjustments when it comes to being 
aggressive about collection intelligence on the enemy.  At a recent hearing of the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, the nominee to be the General Counsel for the DNI, 
Benjamin Powell, announced that the DNI’s office will conduct a review of the privacy 
rules to ensure that intelligence agencies are able to conduct their operations fully without 
infringing on civil liberties.  Committee Chairman Senator Pat Roberts (R-KS) urged the 
DNI’s office to push the limits of the law, but to not let apprehension prevent or restrict 
intelligence operations.  Roberts succinctly stated, 
The challenge today is not so much keeping intelligence officers from 
stepping across the legal line, no one wants that, but (rather) getting them 
to even come close to those lines.  I expect the lawyers of the intelligence 
community -- along with its analysts and operators — to step right up to 
those lines — don't go over them, but step up to them.118 
In order to uncover North Korea’s unconventional weapons program, intelligence 
collection efforts will have to push the limits of legality and be much more aggressive 
than ever before.    
C. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 
With the increased amount of information that flows into collection systems, the 
intelligence analysis part of the process is almost as critical as the collection itself.  If the 
intelligence is collected, but no one is able to analyze it, or if the analysis is faulty or 
incomplete, it is not useful to policymakers and military decisionmakers, which 
ultimately puts American lives and interests at risk.  The WMD Commission cited 
intelligence analysis as a significant problem.  It stated, “Analysts are the repositories for 
what the Intelligence Community doesn’t know, and they must clearly convey these gaps 
to decisionmakers—as well as to collectors so that the Intelligence Community does 
everything it can to fill the holes.”119  A critical problem that exists regarding intelligence 
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analysis is that significant amounts of money are allocated for intelligence collection, but 
the amount of money spent for intelligence analysis is not proportional.  This results in a 
serious dilemma - more information being collected than people available to analyze the 
vast amount of information.  This situation then results in intelligence being insufficiently 
scrutinized and numerous hypotheses left unanalyzed.  Ultimately, oversights such as 
these lead to the faulty analysis of the Iraq WMD scenario. 
To guard against this problem, one analytical concept that deserves discussion is a 
model called Analysis of Competing Hypothesis (ACH).  When using this concept, an 
analyst identifies a number of alternatives and has the alternatives compete against one 
another.  This is designed to get analysts to stray away from solely looking at one theory 
and selecting information that fits that theory.  If evidence exists to support the analysts’ 
theory, the analyst believes his/her theory is correct and ceases to look for any further 
evidence.  If the evidence does not support the theory, the evidence is discarded, and the 
analyst looks for more evidence to support the one theory.  Traditional intelligence 
analysis settles only for the first hypothesis that seems acceptable, and does not provide 
for the analysis of different options.  However, ACH involves searching for evidence in 
order to refute hypotheses.  According to Richards J. Heuer, Jr., author of Psychology of 
Intelligence Analysis, “The most probable hypothesis is usually the one with the least 
evidence against it, not the one with the most evidence for it…conventional analysis 
generally entails looking for evidence to confirm a favored hypothesis.”120  One can 
argue that this type of analysis would have been useful for the Iraq WMD situation.  It 
seemed that none of the intelligence agencies wanted to examine an alternate theory that 
Iraq no longer possessed WMD.   By using ACH, the theory that Saddam Hussein no 
longer had WMD would have been examined much more closely and taken more 
seriously as a possible scenario.  
Senior decisionmakers recognize the need for competitive intelligence analysis.  
CIA Director Porter Goss testified in February 2005 in front of the Senate Select 
 
120 Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. Center for the Study of Intelligence, 
Central Intelligence Agency, 1999.  Portions of this book can be found online at 
http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/19104/ (accessed August 2005). 
 68
                                                
Committee on Intelligence explaining his agency’s efforts in this realm.  Goss stated “I 
am asking for more competitive analysis, more collocation of analysts and collectors, and 
deeper collaboration with agencies throughout the Intelligence Community. Above all, 
our analysis must be objective. Our credibility rests there.”121  Former Secretary of State 
Colin Powell also believed that competitive analysis and collaboration was important for 
better intelligence.  Testifying in front of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee in 
September 2004, Secretary Powell stated,  
We also need to take advantage of complementarities, synergy, 
competitive analysis, and divisions of labor…what I need as Secretary of 
State is the best judgment of those most knowledgeable about the problem.  
[We] need comparable and complementary expertise elsewhere in the IC. 
This additional expertise ensures that as much information and as many 
perspectives as possible have been considered, that differences are 
highlighted, not muted, and that the sum total of intelligence requirements 
can be met by combining the different expertise of all IC constituent 
agencies.122 
The DNI’s new Strategic Analysis Unit will be tasked with helping to develop 
alternative intelligence analysis, create new procedures to review the analysis career field 
and to evaluate the reliability of finished intelligence products, and rebuild the expertise 
of intelligence analysts to ensure the integrity and credibility of intelligence products.123  
This will be critical in helping to work the North Korea threat.  The problems that were 
seen with the Iraq NIE that was hastily put together in the months before OIF would be 
avoided with these new changes.  The new procedures should ensure that finished 
Intelligence Community products will have analysis and input from all of the various 
agencies.  These procedures should also facilitate the use of competitive analysis, which 
will be necessary for understanding the North Korean problem set.  Because of North 
Korea’s unpredictable nature, divergent assessments on the intentions of Kim Chong-il 
exist.  Competitive analysis will help to pull the varying analyses on North Korea and its 
unconventional weapons program and come up likely scenarios for all the different 
 
121 Goss Testimony, 1. 
122 Colin L. Powell, Opening Remarks on Intelligence Reform, Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee, 13 September 2004, 4.  A transcript of the remarks can be found online at 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/ 091304powell.pdf (accessed July 2005).  
123  Hayden House Permanent Select Committee Subcommittee on Oversight Testimony, 2. 
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hypotheses, even if those scenarios seem implausible, or if they go against the most 
popular theory.  It is important that intelligence analysts do not become too attached to 
their assumptions on the North Korean threat, or else they will make the same faulty 
assumptions as they did with Iraq’s WMD program.  Allowing for differing analytical 
assessments instead of pushing for community consensus will give analysis the ability to 
lay out all the possibilities, and try to come up with the most accurate assessment and 
course of action. 
D. INTELLIGENCE COLLABORATION 
Once information has been collected on North Korea’s WMD program and 
analyzed, that information must be shared so that all parties involved has access to the 
same intelligence.  As all of the intelligence reform commissions have pointed out, there 
is a critical need for collaboration between the intelligence agencies.  The WMD 
Commission sharply criticized the Intelligence Community in regards to collaboration 
and information sharing.  The Commission acknowledged that “information sharing still 
depends too much on physical co-location and personal relationships as opposed to 
integrated, Community-wide information networks. Equally problematic, individual 
departments and agencies continue to act as though they own the information they 
collect, forcing other agencies to pry information from them.”124  The most important and 
most controversial of the 9/11 Commission recommendations was to create a DNI 
position to unify the Intelligence Community.  The 9/11 Commission stated that one of 
the two main jobs of the National Intelligence Director should be “to oversee national 
intelligence centers that combine experts from all the collection disciplines against 
common targets— like counterterrorism or nuclear proliferation.”125  The DNI is tasked 
with getting the fifteen intelligence agencies to work closer together.  More importantly 
to this discussion, the need for collaboration is vital to understanding the North Korea 
WMD program.  Intelligence agencies must move from a methodology of “need to 
know” to “need to share.”  This is an inherently difficult concept for the Intelligence 
Community to embrace.  The whole nature of intelligence is based on secrecy and 
 
124 WMD Commission, 14. 
125 9/11 Commission Report, 20-21.    
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compartmentalization.  In addition, many intelligence analysts have been performing 
their tasks in the same way for many years, and it may take time for changes in 
collaboration to be seen.  As one intelligence analyst put it, “the view from my cubicle is 
limited in matters of overall organization charts, [but] increased collaboration should help 
in general.”126  However, in order to deal with the North Korean WMD threat, 
intelligence agencies will have to let go of their traditional stovepipe mentality and share 
information. 
Collaboration will enable the different intelligence agencies to work together by 
putting all the intelligence data in one place, providing the military and political 
leadership with a comprehensive assessment of what is known about North Korea’s 
operations and filling in the intelligence gaps that exist today.  The Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act gives the authority to the DNI to create National 
Intelligence Centers that will consolidate all-source intelligence into one place to perform 
analysis.  The DNI is tasked with ensuring that these national intelligence centers and the 
rest of the Intelligence Community collaborate with each other.  The Act specifies that 
“the Director of National Intelligence shall, to the extent appropriate and practicable, 
ensure that each national intelligence center and the other elements of the intelligence 
community share information in order to facilitate the mission of such center.”127  
National Intelligence Centers are necessary to encourage collaboration and provide all-
source analysis of intelligence.  This initiative will be critical to gaining a better 
understanding of the North Korea unconventional weapons program.   
The Act also created the National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC), which 
will be responsible for developing all-source intelligence support for counterproliferation 
efforts.  This center will develop a repository for current and historical analysis on the 
North Korea WMD program by pulling intelligence from all of the intelligence agencies.  
Fused intelligence in the NCPC should give decisionmakers a comprehensive picture of 
 
126 Anonymous Intelligence Community Intelligence Analyst (name withheld), E-mail 
Correspondence to Author, Subject: “Request for Information,” 25 August 2005. 
127 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 42. 
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Pyongyang’s unconventional weapons program, and the new emphasis on collaboration 
will ensure unity of effort to uncover the secrets of the North Korean regime. 
The Intelligence Community must develop a method to provide incentives for 
intelligence analysts to share information.  Whether it is a type of financial incentive or 
an incentive based on promotion towards future rank, the Intelligence Community needs 
to come up with a way to encourage analysts to collaborate.  Stovepipes that are created 
due to classification reasons and “need to know” issues can be accepted up to a point.  
However, stovepipes that exist because of a need to keep information solely in an 
analyst’s domain are unacceptable and do a disservice to the intelligence profession.  
With North Korea, the Intelligence Community cannot afford to have crucial pieces of 
intelligence residing in one agency, and other agencies looking for the missing piece not 
knowing that the information they seek is sitting on the other side of the Washington, DC 
beltway.  North Korea has gone through extensive efforts to conceal its WMD program, 
and it will take the combined, consolidated efforts of the Intelligence Community to 
reveal Pyongyang’s capabilities and intentions.   
E. CONCLUSION 
The Intelligence Community has taken its share of criticism, especially in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  It has not been easy for the Intelligence 
Community to provide the quality analysis needed for decisionmakers to protect the 
United States.  Admittedly, the Intelligence Community has made mistakes in 
accomplishing that goal.  In its defense, despite a forty billion dollar budget, resources 
have been stretched to the limit and have to be distributed throughout a vast worldwide 
enterprise.  The Intelligence Community also has to answer to many different customers 
throughout the world, to include policymakers, military commanders, congressional 
leaders, and allies.  America’s enemies today often do battle more on an ideological front 
than based on geopolitical boundaries, which makes it difficult to find, fix, and track our 
adversaries.  The Intelligence Community today is faced with numerous challenges in 
this post-Cold War world, trying to understand the intentions and capabilities of 
dangerous nation-states and stateless terrorist elements.  None of these constraints will 
disappear in the near term.  Nonetheless, the extensive intelligence reform effort will 
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allow the Intelligence Community to face these challenges and minimize the constraints 
placed upon it, and ultimately prevent a repeat of the Iraq WMD intelligence failure. 
Thus far, this thesis has shown that changes and reform efforts ongoing in the 
Intelligence Community will lead to a greater understanding of the difficult problem of 
North Korea’s unconventional weapons program.  In this chapter, I have illustrated how 
new intelligence reforms such as the establishment of the DNI, creation of national 
intelligence centers and the National Counterproliferation Center, various HUMINT, 
SIGINT, IMINT and OSINT initiatives, horizontal integration, and persistent surveillance 
will help to develop better assessments on North Korea’s unconventional weapons 
program.  Changes within the Intelligence Community will certainly take time to occur, 
and there is no guarantee that all of the intelligence reform efforts will be successful.  
However, if these reform efforts progress, the Intelligence Community will be able to 
develop a more comprehensive and accurate effort against the North Korean threat.  
There is also a chance that, as in the case of Libya, as we gain more information, the 
intensive efforts of the Intelligence Community will help to ultimately persuade the North 
Korean regime to dismantle its dangerous program.  The final chapter of the thesis will 
examine if there is anything else, in addition to intelligence reform that will help to better 
comprehend the North Korea WMD threat, and eventually better understand North Korea 





[N]one of us should be surprised by the prominence of North Korea as a 
challenge for policymakers and intelligence analysts.  In a very real sense, 
it is one of the inevitable issues of American foreign policy. Inevitable 
because—no matter what level of engagement we may want—the North 
seems sure to engage us.  It could be across a table.  It could be with the 
consequences of its negative behavior or its own instability.  Or it could be 
some combination of them all....128 
     John E. McLaughlin, 17 April 2001 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The North Korean question must be answered before the situation enters a 
dangerous phase.  An unpredictable North Korean adversary with unconventional 
weapons and the ability to sell these weapons places the Pacific region and the 
international community in a precarious situation.  It is critical that the United States 
understand as much as it can about North Korea’s WMD program, and more importantly 
understand how these weapons might be used in a military confrontation against the 
United States and its allies.  As this thesis has explained, the Intelligence Community has 
serious flaws that must be rectified immediately in order to deal with the challenging 
problems North Korea and other threats present.  These flaws have been addressed in 
depth by the 9/11 Commission, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004, and the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and outlined in this thesis.  These intelligence 
reforms are a result of the perceived intelligence failures that have occurred in the last ten 
years to include the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, 
the lack of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and faulty intelligence assessments that 
have underestimated or overestimated the threats of such countries as Iran, North Korea, 
and others.   
                                                 
128 John E. McLaughlin, “North Korea: Engagement or Confrontation,” Remarks by the Deputy 
Director of Central Intelligence to Texas A&M Conference, 17 April 2001.  McLaughlin is the former 
Deputy Director of the CIA.  A transcript of the speech can be found at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2001/ddci_speech _04172001.html (accessed July 2005).   
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Although many of the successes of the Intelligence Community are not publicized 
to the general populace due to security reasons, the recent failures of the Intelligence 
Community have been too glaring to overlook.  In its defense, the Intelligence 
Community has been overwhelmed and too constrained to effectively warn the nation of 
every impending adversary action.  However, under the leadership of the new DNI, the 
Intelligence Community is making the necessary adjustments to better understand the 
dynamic threats that face the United States today.  This final chapter will review the main 
findings of the thesis and their implications for a more comprehensive understanding of 
North Korean WMD.  Next, I will examine whether or not a strategy of engagement with 
the DPRK could enhance intelligence capabilities on the North Korean threat.  Finally, I 
will briefly look at the implications of intelligence reform on other difficult challenges 
such as Iran, terrorism, and proliferation efforts.  
B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
1. Intelligence Collection 
Despite the technological superiority of the United States, the Intelligence 
Community has a difficult challenge regarding intelligence collection.  The threats posed 
to American and allied forces and interests are constant and unyielding.  Keeping watch 
over all of these threats is an almost insurmountable task, but one that the Intelligence 
Community must face.  It has been often argued that many of the intelligence failures are 
partially the result of the litany of demands placed upon the intelligence apparatus.  The 
reforms discussed in Chapter III that are now occurring within the Intelligence 
Community should help intelligence collection assets gain a better grasp of the North 
Korea unconventional weapons threat posed to the international community.  Ongoing 
HUMINT, OSINT, IMINT, and SIGINT reform efforts should help the Intelligence 
Community better collect the intelligence it needs to in order to unravel the secrets of the 
North Korean regime and bring elements of its WMD program to light.  To summarize, 
the following is a graphical depiction of the intelligence collection reforms and their 
implications on the DPRK’s unconventional weapons program. 
Key Initiatives and Implications
Intelligence Collection Reforms and North Korean WMD Program
Reform Initiative Expected Impact
- 50% increase in  HUMINT trained personnel
- Increased # of R&D agents tracking WMD
- Possible increase in first hand accounts 
of DPRK activity/culture
- New CIA Open Source organization
-Increased insight into DPRK culture 
and operations
-Cue other intelligence assets 
- NSA Transformation 2.0 
- Persistent Surveillance
- Horizontal Integration
-Improved information technology network 
and telecommunications architecture to 
prosecute DPRK WMD
- Increased collaboration and integration with
intelligence agencies and lower echelon units
- FIRE Collaborative Tool








- Increased ability to combat DPRK denial, 
deception, and HDBT effort
-Increased collaboration and integration 
with Intelligence Community
-Collaborative analytical tools to model 
WMD threats
-Continuous collection capability to better 
understand DPRK threat  
Figure 4.   Intelligence Collection Reforms and Impact 
on DPRK’s WMD Programs 
 
As shown, intelligence collection reforms should have some impact on how the 
Intelligence Community deals with the North Korea WMD threat.  As explained in 
Chapter IV, an aggressive HUMINT plan, enhanced by an increase in the amount of spies 
working in the field, will help gather crucial “eyes-on” intelligence to determine North 
Korea intentions and capabilities.  A new emphasis on OSINT will allow the Intelligence 
Community to enhance the other intelligence disciplines by supplementing them with 
publicly available open source information.  SIGINT will also be extremely important in 
determining an enemy’s unconventional weapons capabilities and intentions.  As 
discussed in Chapter III, in the post-Cold War era, NSA has had difficulty keeping up 
with the pace of technology.  However, NSA’s dramatic transformation from a “reactive” 
agency focused on Russia to a “proactive” agency focused on multiple, regional threats 
have put the agency in position to be successful dealing with threats in today’s 
international climate like North Korea.  Finally, NGA’s innovative collaborative efforts 
should make it more successful in uncovering North Korean denial and deception efforts.  
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The combination of the Intelligence Community intelligence collection reform efforts 
should have direct effects on how adept the community will be at providing answers on 
the North Korean unconventional weapons threat. 
2. Intelligence Analysis 
One of the priorities of the DNI is the rebuilding of the intelligence analysis 
process.  The Intelligence Community endured much criticism from the various 
commissions tasked to examine the failures of the intelligence effort on problem sets 
such as Iraq, North Korea, and Iran.  As examined earlier, the DNI’s office is in the 
process of building a Strategic Analysis Unit, which will establish new procedures to 
prevent the analytical inconsistencies witnessed in the Iraq WMD analysis.  More 
emphasis will be placed on alternative analysis and ensuring all agencies with a stake in 
the process have input into analytical products.  Below is a list of implications of 
intelligence analysis reform on the DPRK’s WMD program.   
Key Initiatives and Implications
Intelligence Analysis Reforms and North Korean WMD Program
Reform Initiative Expected Impact
-Development of alternative 
and competitive analysis to 
better understand DPRK WMD
capabilities and intentions
-Rebuild the expertise of 
intelligence analysts to ensure 
the integrity and credibility of 
intelligence products to 
prevent repeat of Iraq WMD
failure
- Finished Intelligence 
Community products on DPRK
with analysis and input from 
all of the various agencies
Strategic Analysis Unit
 
Figure 5.   Intelligence Analysis Reforms and Impact 




The Intelligence Community can ill afford to suffer the same problems it 
encountered in the Iraq WMD analysis as it deals with the DPRK WMD threat.  Reform 
efforts should refine the analytical expertise resident to the Intelligence Community to 
allow it to provide timely and accurate analysis to key decisionmakers.  The DNI’s office 
considers intelligence analysis as an important part in the intelligence reform process.  
General Hayden stated, “One of our highest priorities [is] ensuring that our finished 
intelligence products are timely, objective, accurate, actionable, and based on all sources 
of available information.129  The reforms within intelligence analysis will make strides in 
understanding the North Korea unconventional weapons threat.   
3. Intelligence Collaboration 
The harshest criticism of the Intelligence Community has come from those stating 
that the biggest problem of the Intelligence Community is its refusal to share information 
between agencies.  That is expected to change because of the intelligence reforms 
initiated by the DNI and some of the individual intelligence agencies.  Within intelligence 
collaboration, here are the initiatives and the implications for North Korea’s WMD 
program. 
Key Initiatives and Implications
Intelligence Collaboration Reforms and North Korean WMD Program
Reform Initiative Expected Impact
- Develop a repository for current 
and historical analysis on DPRK
WMD program with input from all 
the intelligence agencies
- Unity of effort in developing a 
more comprehensive picture of 
DPRK WMD program
- Consolidation of all-source 
intelligence into one place to 
perform analysis on DPRK threat
National Counterproliferation Center 
and National Intelligence Centers
Establishment of 
Director of National Intelligence
-Move Intelligence Community 
from “need to know” to “need to 
share” methodology to facilitate 
intelligence sharing
 
Figure 6.   Intelligence Collaboration Reforms and Impact 
on DPRK’s WMD Programs 
                                                 
129 Hayden House Permanent Select Committee Subcommittee on Oversight Testimony, 2. 
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Information sharing amongst the intelligence agencies will be a difficult 
challenge.  DNI Negroponte explained his role in this daunting task to Congress at his 
nomination hearing in April 2005.  He stated, “My objective will be to foster proactive 
cooperation among the fifteen Intelligence Community elements. We must make sure that 
information generated in one part of the community is accessible to other parts of the 
community.”130  Efforts of the DNI to increase the amount of information sharing and 
collaboration between intelligence agencies will allow SIGINT and IMINT collection 
efforts to be fused into all-source analysis to give a comprehensive picture of the threats 
facing the United States and its allies.  The creation of national counterproliferation and 
intelligence centers should aid in consolidating intelligence analysis in a centralized 
location, which will allow all-source analysts to access information from the various 
agencies.  Intelligence sharing should give the Intelligence Community the ability to 
develop a more comprehensive assessment of the DPRK’s unconventional weapons 
program. 
C. A NORTH KOREA STRATEGY TO AID THE INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY 
All of these reforms should improve the Intelligence Community’s efforts to 
understand the North Korean problem set.  Nevertheless, intelligence reform alone will 
not completely reduce the intelligence gaps that exist on North Korea.  A different 
strategy approach to complement intelligence reform efforts should enhance our 
knowledge on North Korea even further.  Although there are a number of strategies that 
the United States can undertake such as economic sanctions or coercive strategy of 
preventive or preemptive war, a more diplomatic strategy of engagement could address 
the North Korea crisis and stimulate new ideas to mitigate the potential threat to 
international stability.  An engagement strategy should help reduce the uncertainty of 
North Korea’s WMD program.  Currently, it does not appear that the United States has a 
clear strategy in place to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue, and it was only 
recently that the North Korean nuclear issue became a priority with the current 
administration.  Additionally, the United States remains concerned with North Korea’s 
 
 130 Negroponte, 3-4.   
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chemical and biological weapons programs because of the immediate threat those 
weapons pose to the over 37,000 American troops stationed on the peninsula.  The 
continued development of these dangerous weapons has significant and precarious 
implications on United States strategy and policy, as well as ramifications for the 
Intelligence Community.   
A strategy of engagement with North Korea could allow the Intelligence 
Community to more effectively use the resources at its disposal to understand the 
capabilities and intentions of Kim Chong-il’s regime.  Because North Korea is apt to 
conceal its capabilities and intentions order to increase its leverage power and to 
condition the international community to accept its nuclear weapons program, there is 
limited information available about Pyongyang by which to base intelligence 
assessments.  As is the nature of intelligence, there are inherent difficulties in fully 
understanding the North Korean nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons problem.  
North Korea is an isolationist country, making it extremely challenging to obtain timely 
and accurate information on their activities and operations.  Therefore, intelligence plays 
a key role in understanding the capabilities and intentions of North Korea with regards to 
their WMD programs.  As stated earlier in this thesis, the problem is that the Intelligence 
Community will always have difficulty warning the nation of every enemy operation.  As 
a result, the Intelligence Community is transforming itself in order to more effectively 
meet the challenges of numerous rogue adversaries who have aspirations to obtain 
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.  As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, 
“significant capability shortfalls currently exist in finding and tracking mobile and 
relocatable targets and WMD sites, locating, identifying, and characterizing hard and 
deeply buried targets, [and] providing intelligence support to Information Operations and 
federated intelligence operations."131   Providing military and civilian decision-makers 
with a complete and accurate intelligence picture of the enemy has become problematic, 
specifically when trying to uncover intelligence on an insular country like North Korea.   
 
131 Nuclear Posture Review Report, 8 January 2002.  Excerpts from the report can be found at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm (accessed July 2005), 28. 
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Aware of these dangers, the Intelligence Community is currently undertaking 
major reform efforts in the area of HUMINT, as explained in Chapter III.  HUMINT is 
probably the most important type of intelligence needed to adequately assess a rogue 
nation’s nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities.  There is a need for more assets on 
the ground to infiltrate various adversary organizations, and as stated previously, the 
Intelligence Community is addressing human intelligence as a significant concern.  
Although using this type of intelligence will certainly be difficult in the insular country of 
North Korea, this is the best method to truly assess their capabilities and intentions 
regarding their nuclear program, and this method might be enhanced further with an 
engagement strategy for North Korea.  The opening up of the North Korea society that 
should occur by using an engagement strategy offers the distinct possibility of the United 
States establishing diplomatic relations with the country.  If the United States could open 
a consulate or embassy in Pyongyang, it could give the United States a valuable 
intelligence resource, and could provide invaluable insights into the inner working of 
North Korea.  Because SIGINT is so important in helping to understand an adversary’s 
intentions and capabilities, SIGINT could certainly benefit from a North Korean 
engagement strategy.  Engagement with North Korea could open up opportunities for 
signals intelligence to provide better, more accurate analysis.   The geospatial intelligence 
gathered from the NGA could also benefit from an engagement strategy.  A more open 
North Korean society could possibly provide more avenues for imagery to uncover the 
HDBTs, underground tunnels, and hidden facilities.   
D. IMPLICATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE REFORM ON OTHER PROBLEM 
SETS 
Intelligence reforms will not only have implications on the North Korea problem 
set, but it will have effects on other threats that face the United States.  It could be argued 
that North Korea’s nuclear aspirations are also encouraging other nations such as Iran, 
who is embroiled in its own nuclear controversy with the international community, to 
attempt to become nuclear powers.  The IAEA and the international community have 
condemned Iran for not being forthcoming about their nuclear program, asking them to 
suspend all uranium enrichment activities that could possibly lead to fuel for a nuclear 
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weapon.132  Although a deal with Britain, Germany, and France was struck in November 
2004 to stop enriching uranium, Iran has continued to skirt the regulations and demands 
set forth by the IAEA and the United Nations.  Statements from United States 
intelligence officials and outside nuclear experts have expressed concern that the Bush 
administration's diplomatic efforts with European and Asian allies have only minimally 
decelerated the nuclear weapons programs in Iran and North Korea over the past year, 
and that both countries have made significant progress on their respective programs.133   
A nuclear Iran could have the power to threaten other regional states; the threat of 
Iran selling nuclear weapons and components to terrorist elements looms large over the 
international community.  Iran’s president declared in September 2005 that his country 
will provide nuclear technology to other Muslim states, and European nations 
immediately renewed an offer of economic incentives if Iran would shut down its 
uranium enrichment program.134   Many of the intelligence reforms discussed in this 
thesis will have some relevance on how the Intelligence Community will better 
understand not just the DPRK’s WMD program, but threats such as Iran’s nuclear 
program as well.  Collaboration and intelligence sharing will facilitate better overall 
awareness of Iran’s capabilities and intentions.  It is possible that the proposed increases 
in HUMINT collection assets could also provide the Intelligence Community with 
enhanced analysis of Iran’s activities.  These two difficult intelligence challenges are of 
utmost concern to the senior leadership of the Intelligence Community.  DNI Negroponte 
stated, “These are both states that have got to be watched very carefully, and they are 
 
132 Craig S. Smith, “Atomic Agency Votes to Censure Iran Over Its Nuclear Program,” New York 
Times Online News Service, 19 September 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004 
/09/19/international/middleeast/19nuke.html?hp (accessed August 2005).   
133 David E. Sanger, “Diplomacy Fails to Slow Advance of Nuclear Arms,” New York Times Online 
News Service, 8 August 2004, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract. 
html?res=F10D12F63B580C7B8CDDA10894DC404482 (accessed August 2005). 
134 Sam F. Ghattas, “Iran Set to Give Nuclear Info to Others,” AP Online News Service, 15 September 
2005, http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u= /ap/20050916/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iran_nuclear_7 
(accessed September 2005).  
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extremely high priority…In either instance, left to their own devices they are either going 
to develop or further develop, as the case may be, their nuclear capabilities.”135 
The intelligence reforms will also have implications for the GWOT, non-
proliferation, and counterproliferation efforts.  The National Counterterrorism Center 
created by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act will be responsible for 
integrating intelligence on terrorism and counterterrorism, and performing all-source 
analysis for planning purposes.  It will facilitate intelligence sharing and collaboration in 
order to create comprehensive all-source analysis on terrorist activities, and ensure that 
intelligence gets to decisionmakers in a timely fashion.  It is anticipated that the National 
Counterproliferation Center will become the location for synergizing current and 
historical intelligence analysis on suppliers of dangerous unconventional weapons to 
ensure that WMD is not proliferated to terrorist elements or rogue nations.  The NCPC 
should also be able to help provide information to ensure that friendly forces has the most 
current intelligence to protected them from enemy WMD efforts.  The 2002 National 
Security Strategy states that the United States will take measures to ensure WMD will not 
be proliferated.  The United States will do this with “proactive counter-proliferation 
efforts, strengthened nonproliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorists from 
acquiring the materials, technologies, and expertise necessary for WMD, and effective 
consequence management to respond to the effects of WMD use, whether by terrorists or 
hostile states.”136  The NCPC is tasked with accomplishing this undoubtedly challenging 
mission. 
E.  CONCLUSION 
Given the possibility that North Korea has nuclear weapons with a delivery 
method that could have the capability to reach the United States, and with their chemical 
and biological capabilities, it is imperative for the United States to develop a coherent 
strategy to address the North Korean nuclear issue.  An engagement strategy might prove 
to be the most viable option for the United States to choose.  The success of the 1994 
 
135 John Diamond, “Intel chief: Iraqis in insurgency more elusive,” USA Today Online Service, 13 
September 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-09-12-negroponte_x.htm, 2 (accessed 
September 2005). 
136 National Security Strategy 2002, 12.   
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Agreed Framework serves as proof that a new engagement policy could help ease North 
Korea’s mistrust of the United States, as well as help build a foundation for cooperation 
in other policy areas, and promote multiple avenues for reform in North Korea.137  
Engagement with North Korea could also increase intelligence collection opportunities to 
give decision-makers more accurate information to make better decisions and improve 
coalition counterproliferation efforts.   
A recent visit by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to South Korea and China 
sent a clear message that the United States wants to resolve the situation on the peninsula, 
and that China must play a larger role in easing the nuclear standoff and bringing North 
Korea to the six-party talks with meaningful proposals.  She also hinted that if six-party 
talks fail to bring about any concrete resolutions, the United States would have to explore 
other options to bring an end to the crisis.138  The most recent round of talks in 
September 2005 began with no tangible resolutions.  North Korea returned to the 
negotiations insisting on being supplied a light water nuclear reactor, and threatening to 
increase its weapons production if its demands were not met.139  An agreement was 
finally reached between the DPRK and the United States in which North Korea agreed to 
give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for economic and security considerations, and 
also return to the non-proliferation treaty.  However, the apparent breakthrough in the 
nuclear standoff is tempered by North Korea’s insistence being supplied with light-water 
reactors for electricity, a point previously rejected by the United States.140  
Despite this possible breakthrough in the crisis, it is still difficult to predict the 
intentions of the North Korean regime.  An unpredictable North Korea armed with 
unconventional weapons leads to the possibility of the isolationist country selling nuclear 
 
137 Newnham, 175. 
   138 Saul Hudson, “U.S. Says It May Need New Ways to Deal with N. Korea,” Reuters Online News 
Service, 21 March 2005, http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=topNews&storyID=7958343 
(accessed August 2005). 
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140 “N. Korea warns U.S. not to attack.” AP Online News Service, 22 September 2005, 
http://aimpoints.hq.af.mil/display.cfm?id=6730 (accessed September 2005). 
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weapons or materials to other rogue states or terrorists, or North Korea putting a nuclear 
weapon on a missile and threatening regional neighbors or even the United States.  
Equally as devastating would be a preemptive biological or chemical attack against a 
United States or coalition military installation, causing widespread panic and effectively 
paralyzing impending military operations.  Intelligence plays a large role in determining 
the nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities of rogue nations and terrorist entities; if 
we do not understand the adversary, ultimately we will have difficulty in defeating the 
adversary.  This is inherently a difficult task for intelligence, and there will always be 
some type of uncertainty when dealing with gathering intelligence.  This thesis has 
detailed how the current transformation and reform efforts occurring in the Intelligence 
Community should increase the capabilities and cooperation between various intelligence 
agencies working on uncovering the North Korean unconventional weapons issue.  A 
strategy of engagement with the DPRK could enhance those intelligence capabilities even 
further.   
Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that any of the intelligence reforms outlined 
in this thesis are the ultimate answer.  DNI Negroponte stated in a recent interview that 
many of the changes occurring within the Intelligence Community will take time and 
patience.  He remarked, “We're talking about something that is a medium and long-term 
proposition. We're not talking about changes that can necessarily be instituted 
overnight…[but] we need a single Intelligence Community that cooperates seamlessly, 
moves quickly, and spends more time thinking about the future than about the past.”141  
Time will tell if these changes and reforms are given the chance to take hold.  But if 
intelligence reform is given a legitimate chance to succeed, the capabilities of the 
Intelligence Community should be enhanced for not just North Korea’s unconventional 
weapons program, but for all the difficult problems that face the United States and its 
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